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THE REQUIREMENT OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
KENNETH CULP DAVISt
THE purpose of a hearing in the administrative process is to assure
enlightened administrative action which safeguards affected interests by
taking into account both information and persuasion which those interests
can supply and by subjecting the materials on which the agency acts to
the parties' testing processes. The criteria for determining when oppor-
tunity for hearing should be required must be sought by inquiring into
the practical means by which that purpose may best be achieved. This
paper is the product of a search for those criteria.'
The terms "hearing" and "opportunity to be heard" probably convey
the same core of meaning to most minds, but their fringe of uncertainty
is wide. I believe that when either judges or legislatures use the term
"opportunity to be heard" they have in mind one of two ideas: (1) a
chance to present argument at a public meeting, or (2) opportunity for
a trial resembling that of the courtroom. 2 The term as commonly used
does not mean talking informally to the man who decides, or submit-
ting written evidence or argument without an oral process,3 or partici-
pating in a conference out of which a decision grows, or answering one
" Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School.
1. 'My inquiry is into the question when opportunity for hearing ought to be required.
I shall not always carefully distinguish requirements imposed by judges in the name of
a constitution from requirements imposed by legislatures or from requirements impoed
by agencies upon themselves. They tend to merge. It is often observed that constitu-
tional requirements should be kept to a minimum and that the agencies themselves should
often follow higher standards than the judges require. I can agree only with sEome res-
ervation; I wonder how much weight should be given to an agency's natural tendency
to interpret a court's refusal to find a denial of due process as judicial approval of what
the agency has done, with the practical result that the agency's practice coincides vth
the constitutional minimum. There are many signs that this tendency is especially pro-
nounced among some state agencies.
2. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure uses the term
"adversary hearing" for what I call trial. See REP. ATT'v GEN. Com s. AD. Proc. (1941)
108. [Hereinafter cited as REPoRT (1941)]. The term "adversary", I thin:, is best used
to indicate opposing parties, and parties may oppose each other at speech-making hear-
ings in which trial methods are not used. An argument to an appellate court is adversary,
but it is not a trial.
3. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 386 (1903) : "If it is enough that,
under such circumstances, an opportunity is given to submit in writing all objections to
and complaints of the tax to the board, then there was a hearing afforded in the case at
bar. But we think that something more than that, even in proceedings for taxation, is
required by due process of law. . . . A hearing in its very essence demands that he who
is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief,
and, if need be, by proof, however informal."
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of the questionnaires which provide the entire factual basis for the deci-
sion, or receiving a tentative draft of proposed rules with an invitation
to submit written comments, or sending a representative to collaborate
with the agency's staff in drafting regulations, or participating in the
selection of an advisory group which may make recommendations to the
agency, or answering oral questions asked by the agency's interviewers.
I doubt if the term as generally employed would include inspecting all
the data collected by the agency and submitting comments or evidence
informally. And when, for instance, labor organizations and employers
appoint representatives to serve along with public representatives on a
board which has power to decide, I doubt if that much alone would
be considered opportunity to be heard."
Of course, a single proceeding may be hybrid, with varying propor-
tions of the speech-making method and of the trial method.' But it is
nevertheless convenient for discussion to treat the two methods as dis-
tinct. A speech-making hearing, often called a public meeting, is normally
governed by no more rules than are essential for orderly presentation
of arguments. The trial technique draws heavily from complexities
evolved in the judicial system. The essential characteristics of the method
of trial are: (1) requiring the findings to be based upon evidence in a
formal record of the proceedings, except to the extent that official notice
is appropriate, and (2) giving each party, within wide limits, full rights
of cross-examination and rebuttal, as well as the right to offer affirma-
tive proof. Although the oath is usually required and specific findings
are often necessary, probably neither of these elements should be regarded
as among the essential characteristics of a trial.
Other Devices as Substitutes for Hearings. For some types of busi-
ness the objective of assuring enlightened administrative action which
properly safeguards affected interests is better attained by devices other
than hearings, for a trial may be obviously inappropriate and a public
meeting may not afford adequate safeguards.
When technicians of shipping companies collaborated with technicians
of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in preparing elab-
4. Both the National Railroad Adjustment Board and the now abolished National
Defense Mediation Board are suggestive in this connection. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc.,
The National Railroad Adjustment Board, SEN. Doc. No. 10, Pt. 4, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941); Jaffe and Rice, Report on the Work of the National Dcjense Alediation Board
(1942) (mimeographed).
5. A typical legislative committee hearing is hybrid. It is not a trial; tihe com-
mittee decides on all the information it has, whether in a formal record or not, and pri-
vate parties usually are not given the privilege of cross-examination. The hearing is
mostly a speech-making hearing, with cross-examination by committee members and by
the committee's counsel.
[Vol. 51 : 10931094
REQUIREMENT OF OPPORTUNITY
orate regulations governing tanker vessels, including detailed specifica-
tions for construction, the companies got far better protection for their
interests than any kind of a hearing could have afforded.'
In formulating regulations governing transportation of household
goods by motor carriers the ICC conducted 89 informal conferences
attended by 1,740 individuals representing 1,286 carriers, and then
submitted questionnaires, 2,631 of which were analyzed and digested by
the Commission's staff. The later hearings were probably relatively un-
important either as sources of information or as means of understanding
points of view.'
The Attorney General's Committee, in the body of its report, admir-
ingly described methods of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System: "The practice of the Board . . . is especially note-
worthy because of the Board's virtually complete reliance upon confer-
ences rather than hearings as a means of enabling affected parties to
participate in the rule-making process. Over a period of time the Federal
Reserve System has developed a procedure of consultation and confer-
ence. . . . Outside views come from replies to letters which the Board
sends out, and orally at conferences. Usually statements are put in
writing and a stenographic report of conferences is made. Frequently,
the interchange of data and views is facilitated by mimographing and
circulating them, both within and without the staff. The procedure is
flexible, thorough, adapted to bringing the knowledge of an expert
agency to bear upon its rule-making problems, and fair . . .
In the preparation of insurance regulations for motor carriers, a repre-
sentative of the ICC travelled through fifteen states to interview repre-
sentatives of motor carriers, members of state commissions, executives
of insurance companies, and insurance agents and brokers. Later, con-
ferences were held with committees representing the bus industry, the
truck industry, and the insurance associations. Although the Commission
held hearings on the proposed regulations, the preliminary interviews
and conferences were probably more effective in protecting private
interests.9
One of the most satisfactory means of safeguarding affected interests
is to make copies of proposed rules available to those affected, and invite
written comments. Depending on circumstances, later hearings may or
6. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Depariment of Comunerce, Brcia of Varine I,:-
spection and Nazigation, Sr.z. Dcc. No. 16, Pt. 10, 76th Ctng., 3d Sets. I-1940) 33. The
monograph writer says flatly of this activity: "Public hearings as such have hen
largely empty forms, adding nothing to what is already knovn."
7. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commieree C'ommission, SL.. Dec. Nu.
10, Pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 85-6.
S. REPoRT (1941) 104.
9. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commerce Commdssion, SE:;. Doe. No.
10, Pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 85.
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may not be desirable. On some types of rules, a speech-making hearing
preceding the drafting and promulgating of the rules provides far less
practical protection than a procedure which includes questionnaires, inter-
views, and conferences, followed by submission of proposed rules for
written comments.
Increasingly important is the representative board. For instance, the
Emergency Price Control Act permits establishment of price ceilings
without hearings, but requires that "before issuing any regulation or
order . . . the Administrator shall, so far as practicable, advise and
consult with the representative members of the industry," and that after
a maximum price has been established, "the Administrator shall, at the
request of any substantial portion of the industry . . . appoint an in-
dustry advisory committee . . . [and] shall from time to time, at the
request of the committee, advise and consult with the committee . . .
[which] may make such recommendations to the Administrator as it
deems advisable." 10
Other devices which may supplement or supplant hearings are many
and varied. One can find them in nearly every agency though they are
seldom recognized in judicial opinions." They are often the lifeblood
of enlightened and fair administrative action.
The problem of providing protection against uninformed or arbitrary
action is thus sometimes broader than what is embraced in the idea of
opportunity to be heard. Sometimes the vital question is not whether
to require opportunity to be heard; the vital question may be: To what
extent and in what way should parties affected by administrative action
be permitted to participate in the process of formulating that action?
The key may often be participation, not hearing. Sometimes to be pre-
ferred are collaboration in drafting, conferences, interviews, question-
naires, submission of proposed rules with invitations for written com-
ments, consultations with representative boards, and other like devices,
separately or in combination.
The criterion for determining what methods of participation should
be allowed, and whether the methods of public speeches or trial are
requisite, lies in a pragmatic answer to the question- what method will
10. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. 421, 77th Cong., 2d SCs4. (Jan.
30, 942), §2(a).
11. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure places great
emphasis on the importance of the agencies' methods of investigation: "Where confer-
ences and hearings are not held, the initial investigation is of all-embracing importance
in the rule-making process. Where conferences and hearings are held after the investi-
gatory stage has passed, they may or may not add to the information of the agency.
Hence the initial investigation is of primary significance in most instances of rule-mak-
ing. The methods by which it may be conducted are of great importance to affected
private interests." REPORT (1941) 111-14.
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in the circumstances best achieve the objective of assuring enlightened
action which will afford proper safeguards to affected interests? The
test must be wholly practical.
Thc General Judicial Failure to Rccognize Alternative Dcvices. Not
only do most of the judicial opinions regard opportunity for hearing or
lack of it as the pivot on which fairness to the parties turns, but in
deciding whether or not opportunity to be heard is necessary they tend
to ignore the alternative devices. State ex rel. State Board of Mill:
Control v. Newark Milk Co.' is illustrative. One side asserted that the
board fixed minimum milk prices "'without an investigation by the con-
trol board of the milk industry and without notice to the defendant or
opportunity afforded it to be heard'.""'' The other side claimed that
the board "conducted an investigation" and acted only " 'after careful
consideration of the facts and proofs acquired in said investigation'."
The court ignored this dispute about the alleged investigation. So far as
the opinion reveals, the court had no interest whatsoever in the kind of
investigation that might have been made. It held that "notice of pro-
ceedings before the subordinate body exercising, as here, the adminis-
trative function is not requisite to valid action by that body. Nor is a
hearing required . . ."' I believe the court thus excluded from con-
sideration one of the most important factors that should have entered
into its decision. To allow the board to issue a price order without
in any way securing information and an understanding of points of
view from the producers and dealers seems highly questionable, if we
assume our basic system of reliance upon courts to give content to the
idea of procedural due process. But to permit the New Jersey board
to issue a price order without either a trial or formal speeches at a
public meeting might well be in keeping with the basic objective of
assuring enlightened action and adequate safeguards for private inter-
ests. If the board's investigation included, as it may have, extensive
consultations and conferences, permission to all concerned to examine
accumulated data, invitations to parties to submit written evidence, sub-
mission of comprehensive questionnaires to producers and dealers, and
publication of a tentative order for comment by parties before promul-
gation of the final order, the protection might have been superior to that
provided by speech-making at a public meeting, or even better than a
trial. At all events, the New Jersey court, in paying no attention to the
board's investigation, ignored the essence of the problem.
12. 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 At. 116 (1935).
13. Id. at 522, 179 AtI. at 125.
14. Ibid.
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The leading case of Commonwealth v. Sisson'l may be more nearly
-typical. A fish and game board ordered a mill owner to discontinue
a practice of thirty years' standing of discharging sawdust into a stream.
The mill "had been examined by the board" but a hearing was requested
and denied. The court rejected the owner's contention that the order
could properly be entered "only after the hearing of evidence." Of its
own decision the court declared: "The practical result is that the de-
fendants are forbidden to conduct their sawmill as they have conducted
it for thirty years, by a board who have not heard evidence and have
refused the defendants a hearing; that the action of the board is final,
and that no compensation is due them. This result may seem strange
"16 I think it is strange indeed to uphold the order without in
any way allowing the owner to try to persuade the board, with facts
or argument, that it should not be entered, or that some other order
would be preferable. But I think it would be just as strange to require
a courtroom type of proceeding at which evidence is presented and
subjected to cross-examination, with the decision limited to facts of
record. To enter the order without consulting the owner is grossly
unfair; to use a trial technique is clumsy and wasteful. Yet these are
apparently the only alternatives the court considered, for it makes no
mention of the owner's opportunities, or lack of them, for informally
bringing its facts and arguments to the board's attention. The alterna-
tives are not limited to requiring all -that is, a trial- or nothing. If
the decision means that the board may, without prior knowledge of the
owner, suddenly issue the final order, I find the decision shocking. If,
on the other hand, it means that the board may investigate the fish and
the stream and the sawdust and alternative disposal methods, submit its
findings to the owner, invite the owner to suggest reasons for some
different solution of the problem, and then enter the order without resort
to trial, I regard the decision as sensible. But in the opinion as rendered,
the crucial considerations are missing.
McGrew v. Industrial Commission 7 illustrates another deserving device
which is often beyond the range of judicial vision. The Utah Com-
mission had an assignment which required nothing less than finding,
inter alia, what wage for women and minors was adequate "to supply
the cost of proper living." The legislature did not pretend that that was
a mere matter of taking evidence and finding facts, but sensibly pro-
vided for a wage board of equal numbers of employees and employers
with a member of the commission as chairman, the board to investigate,
find facts, and make recommendations to the commission, which would
15. 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619 (1905).
16. Id. at 253, 75 N. E. at 622.
17. 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 608 (1938).
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then hold "public hearings" and issue its order. The court perfunctorily
recited the provision for the wage board and then apparently forgot it.
The Commission held what the court called a "public meeting" at which
proponents and opponents of the recommended order were allotted three
hours each to talk. No witnesses were sworn, and no record was pre-
pared. The court said it was "a case of 'we should' or 'we should not'
instead of a presentation of facts on the questions up for hearing."
Without distinguishing between statutory and constitutional require-
ments, the court held: "The legislature in requiring a full and public
hearing had regard to judicial standards . . which are the essence
of due process in a proceeding of a judicial nature."18 Now, I submit
that the Utah legislature's judgment was better than the court's. Find-
ing what wage is adequate to proper living does not call merely for proof
with evidence, but for practical methods of adjusting wages to satisfy
both employer and labor groups. The proper tools are not testimony
and cross-examination but negotiation and bargaining and mediation.
A board composed of equal numbers of employers and employees with
a member of the commission as chairman is a good device for that
purpose. Let each faction of the board dig up its facts and convince
the opposing faction, with the chairman as mediator; let them thresh out
the problem until they compromise or until they find compromise im-
possible and make a report by a majority of which the chairman is
the decisive member. Then let the commission approve, if it chooses,
and have the public come in and make speeches for and against the recom-
mendation."9 That is one good way to fix a wage. It is a democratic
process; it does not falsely pretend to be a scientific process. The court's
virtual disregard of the function of the wage board seems to me, once
again, to ignore the essence.2"
18. Id. at 225, 85 P. (2d) at 618.
19. As another objectionable aspect of the McGrew case, witness tie followving:
... The record contains perhaps 200 leters to the Commission from diverse parties
urging or opposing the action taken. While the Commission filed them and certified
them to us along with the record, most of them are in no sense evidence and we conclude
that the Commission did not consider them and wmas not influenced thereby.' Id. at 224,
85 P. (2d) at 617. The court, thinking the Commission was trying a case, did not real-
ize that letter-writing might be one of the most valuable means by which the Commis-
sion could learn the views of those concerned, and that, unlike the trial of a case, thvse
views ought to enter into the choice to be made. The process of rule-making should he
democratic, not undemocratic.
20. Contrast the McGrezo case with Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P. (2d)
665 (1940), holding that due process requirements were met where a plan involving
milk price fixing was formulated through a democratic process in which prcducers par-
ticipated, and where the plan was adopted after a public meeting but without a trial.
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Inappropriateness of Trial Technique for Helping Tribunal Make
Choices of Law and Policy. A few elementary principles are not always
appreciated. The trial technique is designed for proof of disputed facts.
Proof is different from persuasion. When the objective is to persuade,
argument rather than evidence is called for. Persuasion may include
presentation of facts, as in the Brandeis type of brief and the oral
argument based upon it. Courts permit presentation of some facts as
a part of argument, oral and written, and require other facts to be
presented as evidence. The facts which concern the parties, their cir-
cumstances, their background conditions, the value of their property,
who did what and why and when and how and with what motive or
intent- these facts normally come in as evidence. Facts which do not
peculiarly concern particular parties, facts which do not make up the
gist of adjudication but help the tribunal to make choices of law or
policy, as well as facts which are undisputed, may appropriately be pre-
sented to a court through written and oral argument rather than through
evidence. The former in another context have been denominated adjudi-
cative facts, and the latter legislative facts, and these terms are con-
venient though the lines are not precise.2
Since legislative facts generally may appropriately be presented to a
court as a part of oral and written argument, it should follow that
legislative facts may be presented to an administrative tribunal in the
same way, that is, without use of the trial technique. Indeed, trial
methods for presentation of ideas and arguments and legislative facts
are often so clumsy and inefficient that one might expect any alert tribunal
to assume as a matter of course that trial methods should normally be
restricted to adjudicative facts. The following passage from a mono-
graph on the ICC illustrates an extreme misuse of the trial technique:
• . . in the course of the hearings on safety regulations a witness
was offered who was duly identified and qualified at sonic length.
Finally the witness was asked if he had recommendations to make
concerning the proposed regulations which the Commission had
distributed. In the transcript appears the following:
A. We have a statement we would like to submit.
Q. And is that statement in writing?
A. It is.
Commissioner ......... Do you offer this for the record?
A. Yes; if the Commissioner please, if there is no objection,
I would like to ask at this time that it be received as an exhibit.
Commissioner ......... Any objection? [No response].
It will be received and marked as "Exhibit 13."
21. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process
(1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 402 et seq.
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Exhibit 13 is entitled "Statement by ......... on behalf of the
Truck Owners Association of California." After identifying the
association it declares: "We desire to make the following recom-
mendations." Then follow various suggestions referring to pages
and sections of the proposed regulations. It is suggested, for ex-
ample, that the minimum age of drivers ought to be 18 instead of
21. Suggestions are made that words should be inserted or changed
or omitted at certain lines and pages of the proposed regulations.
Nearly every paragraph begins with "It is suggested that" or
"It is recommended that." No facts of consequence are presented
which seem to make the oath desirable or make the formality of
the presentation of the statement necessary. Throughout the record
are colloquies of counsel about admissibility of evidence, motions
to strike statements from the record, objections to permitting a
witness to state what he believes but what he does not know, and
all that goes with the cumbersomeness and awkwardness of highly
legalistic courtroom proceedings. The continual "May it please the
court" of an attorney in one proceeding blended with all the other
trimmings. Much cross-examination is conducted which appears to
be wholly pointless and examining attorneys sometimes attempt to
force witnesses to answer "yes" or "no" where the witness wants
to make an explanatory statement. Numerous discussions appear to
have been held off the record. Much of the evidence was of neces-
sity in the nature of opinion evidence or argument and the record
seems clearly to reveal that direct and cross-examination are mot the
most facile methods for presentation of arguments.
By reason of all this formality at the hearing, there is a tendency
throughout the proceeding to follow the forms of adjudication. The
Commission does not seem to recognize that the process of rule-
making need not necessarily always conform to the practices which
are customary in the exercise of the judicial function. Rule 3(k) of
the safety regulations provides that a driver must (with certain
exceptions) have ability to read and speak the English language.
In its formal report the Commission states: "Item 3(k), relating to
knowledge of the English language, is amply supported by the
record." In another part of its formal opinion, the Commission
declares: "There is testimony in the record to the effect that amber
is inherently a more desirable color for front clearance lamps than
green, owing to its acceptance as a 'caution' signal and to the possi-
bility of confusing a green clearance lamp with a 'go' signal." In
the hours of service case are statements such as the following:
We are convinced, from a consideration of the evidence, that it
is safer under adverse weather and traffic conditions for a driver to
drive or operate a motor vehicle for 12 hours at a lower rate of
speed than attempt to cover the same distance in 10 hours of driving
at a higher speed.
1942] 1101
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The expressions of opinion by witnesses are usually referred to
as evidence and testimony, but in the hours of service case the
Commission made the statement that-
practically all of the witnesses representing carriers of property
contended that we should prescribe a rule which would permit a
maximum of 12 hours . . [Italics supplied] .22
The Food and Drug Administration takes "evidence" from "wit-
nesses" who "testify" on such questions as whether "Golden" should
be permitted as a synonym for "Yellow" in the labeling of canned corn,
whether "Evaporated Milk" and "Concentrated Milk" should be used
as synonyms, whether pear halves should have a minimum weight of
4/5 ounces or 3/5 ounces, whether tomato puree made from peelings
and cores should be labeled "Trimmings" or "Tomato By-Products"
or "Residual Tomato Material", whether peaches packed in a weak
water solution must be labeled "In Water Slightly Sweetened" or may
be labeled "In Light Syrup". 3 At the hearings involving questions like
these, any interested person may cross-examine any witness. Yet a care-
ful commentator has observed that the primary value of the hearing is
that it gives the Administrator "the benefit of criticisms and suggestions
from representatives of the industries which will be affected, and from
spokesmen for the consuming public."21 4  The problems lend themselves
far better to written and oral argument than to testimony, cross-exam-
ination, and a decision on a formal record. The hearings now held are
"unwieldy and sometimes almost chaotic" 25 and consume weeks and
even months. I think far better results would be obtained, with much
22. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commerce Commission, SFN. Doe. No.
10, Pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 86-7. The ICC, in its 1940 annual report refers
to the monograph prepared for the Attorney General's Committee and declares at pages
19-20: "We have not been able to accept the suggestion in the monograph that many
of our functions could be best performed by following the technique of investigation fa-
miliar in the practice of the committees of Congress, rather than by conducting hearings
of a public character. We consider ourselves bound by the requirement of judicial deci-
sions of our highest court defining the statutory terms 'hearing' and 'full hearing.'" I
think this language of the Commission shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what
is meant by "the technique of investigation familiar in the practice of committees of
Congress." The Commission, I believe, should recognize the usefulness of public hear-
ings which are not trials. To assume that every hearing must follow courtroom patterns
is wasteful. Furthermore, I know of no "decisions of our highest court" which require
trials for rule-making proceedings and other proceedings which involve primarily ques-
tions of interpretation or law or policy and do not involve conflicting evidence.
23. Heady, Administrative Rule-Making runder Section 701(e) of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (1942) 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 406.
24. Id. at 444.
25. Id. at 463.
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less expense, through public meetings rather than trials.20 Unlimited
cross-examination by adversaries is ag inappropriate in these cases as
it is in an argument before an appellate court. Cross-examination may
be useful, but it should normally be conducted not by an adversary for
the purpose of confusing and destroying but by the tribunal for the
purpose of clarifying and constructing. Except in the unusual case in
which disputes arise about specific primary facts, the oath and testimony
are out of place; facts may be informally presented in a natural narrative
form in briefs and arguments. Such simple and direct methods may
lead the agency into deeper understanding of its problems than dozens
of confused and confusing trials, with all their procedural rubbish,
motions and objections and rulings and technicalities and exclusionary
rules and the put-in-an-appearance-to-collect-a-fee type of lawyer. Of
course, in the rare instances when specific facts are disputed, and testi-
mony subject to cross-examination is appropriate, the tribunal may
appropriately resort to a trial technique, carefully limiting the trial
methods to discovery of the disputed facts.
The Federal Power Commission issued two sets of regulations pro-
viding uniform systems of accounts, one for electric companies and one
for natural gas companies. After extensive studies and conferences had
resulted in tentative drafts, hearings were held in both cases. In the
first, informality prevailed, round table conferences were held, and
speeches were made. In the second, the trial technique was used, wit-
nesses gave sworn testimony, and parties were represented by counsel
who formally introduced documentary evidence into the record and cross-
examined opposing witnesses. The only reason for this strange use of
the trial technique was the Commission's desire to satisfy "the most
aggressive proponent of formalism" at a time when public clamor con-
cerning administrative procedure was at its height. One observer wisely
declares: "Now that the deed has been done, there appears to be no
sentiment that the proceeding brought to light any information or
opinions which could not have been obtained by much less wasteful and
time-consuming methods."2
Fixing of Rates, Prices, and Wages. The Supreme Court has flatly
declared in a gas rate case: ',Ve are concerned only with the question
of procedural due process, that is, whether the Commission in its pro-
26. The responsibility for the clumsy methods apparently rests mostly vith Ctn-
gress, which has provided: "The Secretary shall base his order only on substantial ei-
dence of record at the hearing . .. ." 52 ST.T. 1040, 1055 (1938), 21 U. S. C., §§301,
371 (1940). See Fuchs, Thc Formulation and Revewv of Regulations Under Mhe Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1939) 6 LAw & CoNrmp. Pron. 43.
27. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Fedcral Power Commission, SE,.. Do c. Nu. 10, Pt.
12, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (1941) 40.
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cedure . . . failed to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Consti-
tution. We examine this question in the light of well settled principles
governing the proceedings of rate-making commissions. The right to
a fair and open hearing is one of the rudiments of fair play assured to
every litigant by the Federal Constitution as a minimal requirement." 28
The first two Morgan cases20 certainly demonstrate that an agency may
fail to meet the requirements of "fair play" even when a trial technique
is used in fixing rates. The Utah court has specifically held that a speech-
making or public-meeting type of hearing was insufficient for fixing
minimum wages,80 and the Pennsylvania court has rendered a similar
decision on fixing milk prices."' In the recent Opp case, 2 Mr. Justice
Stone characterized the proceedings before the Wage and Hour Admin-
istrator in a minimum-wage case as "judicial in character" ' and de-
clared: "The demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the
initial stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in an
administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before
the final order becomes effective." 84 A discerning commentator finds
in this language the implication that due process requires opportunity
for hearing in a wage proceeding under the Fair Labor Standards Act.0
Nevertheless, despite these authorities,8" a sweeping conclusion that
opportunity for hearing is a constitutional requisite for fixing all rates
28. Railroad Comm. of Calif. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U. S. 388, 392-93
(1938).
29. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936) ; Morgan v. United States, 304
U. S. 1 (1937).
30. McGrew v. Industrial Comm., 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 608 (1938).
31. Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm., 332 Pa. 15, 1 A. (2d) 775
(1938). In both the McGrew case and the Colteryahn case the statute required a hear-
ing, but the hearings given were held inadequate. In neither case does it appear clearly
'whether the decision was based on constitutional or statutory grounds.
32. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, 312 U. S. 126
(1941).
33. Id. at 147.
34. Id. at 152-53.
35. Fuchs, Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case with Respect
to Procedure and Judicial Review in Administrative Rule-Making (1941) 27 WAsH. U.
L. Q. 1, 7 et seq.
36. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924), although not a rate case, Is
closely relevant. The New York Central applied to the ICC for approval of its pur-
chase of two terminal railways which had been previously independent. The application
was opposed by six competing carriers. The Commission, after hearing, granted the
application, but in a bill for an injunction it was alleged that the finding was wholly un-
supported by evidence, and the Court stated: "We must take that fact as admitted for
the purposes of this appeal." Id. at 262. It was contended in the Supreme Court that
since the power was "purely discretionary" the order need not be supported by evidence.
Mr. Justice Brandeis declared for a unanimous Court: "Congress by using the phrase
'whenever the Commission is of opinion, after hearing,' prescribed quasi-judicial action,
• . .The provision for a hearing implies both the privilege of introducing evidence and
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and prices and wages seems to me quite unjustified. The authority the
other way, to be sure, is not very impressive. State courts in Wash-
ington 7 and New Jersey"' have held that no hearings of any kind are
necessary for fixing minimum wages and milk prices, respectively. The
California Supreme Court refused to require a trial technique for fixing
milk prices, holding a public meeting sufficient, 9 and a federal court
has likewise found no procedural deficiency in speech-making hearings
for fixing milk prices.4 0
*We might easily go no further than to observe the three-way split in
the authorities- some require trials, some are satisfied with public
meetings, and some permit elimination of hearings altogether. Or we
might assume that the clear language of the Supreme Court in the gas
rate case, since it rests on the Federal Constitution, is controlling of
all the cases. But any such conclusion would be oversimplification.
Even though rate-fixing and wage-fixing are all a part of price-fixing
in the broad sense, still it is unwise to lump all price-fixing together
and fit the same procedure pattern to every proceeding. A public utility
rate case has little in common with a price-ceiling problem under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 concerning such a question as
freezing ;ill retail prices on gasoline in the East, and even less in com-
mon with more general freezing orders. Milk prices and wages are
different from both utility rates and price ceilings. How to proceed so
as to assure exercise of an informed judgment and protection of affected
interests does not entail a mere reference to legal conceptualism-putting
price-fixing in the slot and getting a jack-pot of trials. The problem
is intensely practical. Its solution lies in analyzing the materials needed
in the various proceedings, and ascertaining what means will best assure
enlightened action that will take into account what the parties have to
offer by way of information, persuasion, and testing.
In a familiar type of public utility rate making the principal facts
relate to the valuation of the company's property. Probably no one is
the duty of deciding in accordance with it. To refuse to consider evidence introduced or
to make an essential finding without supporting evidence is arbitrary action ." Id.
at 264-65.
37. Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595 (1920). The court
relied on such reasons as: "It would be almost if not utterly impossible to notify every
employer of such labor within the state." "Employers have no vested right to employ
women or minors, and therefore are not entitled to notice as a matter of right"
38. State ex reL State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N. J. Eq.
504, 179 Atl. 116 (1935). The court declared of milk price fiding that "such regulation
is purely a legislative function," relying heavily on the dearly unsupportable major prem-
ise that opportunity for hearing is unnecessary for exercise of a legislative function.
39. Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P. (2d) 665 (1940).
40. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 16 F. Supp. 575 (E. D. Va. 1936), ajgd
zwithout passing on hearing question, 300 U. S. 608 (1937).
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in better position than the company's representatives to offer affirmative
proof and helpful cross-examination and rebuttal. The valuation facts
peculiarly concern the property of one company. They are the very stuff
of adjudication, the facts to which law and policy and discretion are
applied to get the decision. When they are controversial and disputed,
they lend themselves to treatment like the adjudicative facts of an or-
dinary lawsuit, to proof with evidence, to cross-examination and rebuttal,
with the grounds of decision limited to the facts in the formal record.
A broad price-ceiling order under the Price Control Act, on the other
hand, usually will not depend upon disputed facts which peculiarly
concern individual parties, but upon general economic facts, largely
susceptible of statistical analysis and presentation. These facts must be
found by methods of economist and statistician, not by methods of
judge and jury. Informal investigation and research will normally pro-
vide initial materials, with possible use of questionnaires, written reports,
published materials, interviews and conferences. Disputes over specific
facts are unlikely. The realm of controversy will lie in the interpreta-
tion of facts, the exercise of discretion, the formulation of policy. Such
questions do not call for proof. Although a trial is an unsurpassed
device for dealing with conflicting evidence, for determining'what evi-
dence is to be believed and what evidence is to be disregarded as probably
false, and for testing through cross-examination and through rebuttal
evidence the veracity, memory, perception, and narration of witnesses,
an inquiry into general economic and statistical information seldom
requires that process. When a "witness" presents charts and graphs
and tables, prepared by subordinates working under him, who in turn
derived their information from widespread studies and investigation,
what possible sense is there in an oath by which the "witness" swears
to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? The oath,
cross-examination by adversaries, and other courtroom trimmings usually
are not adapted to developing the kind of understanding that must go
into a freezing order or a price ceiling.
This is not to say that safeguards to private parties should not be
provided, or that parties should not be allowed to participate in pro-
viding information and argument and in subjecting materials unfavor-
able to their interests to their testing processes. Officials may often appro-
priately present the results of investigation and research and invite
arguments. Sometimes a hearing resembling that of a legislative com-
mittee may be convenient, with constructive cross-examination by pre-
siding officers. But oral presentations may be in many cases less effective
than written arguments. The Price Control Act accordingly provides
that even when protests are filed the proceedings may be limited to filing
affidavits, other written evidence, and briefs, without an oral process.
If, however, private interests are numerous, a wide distribution of the
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results of preliminary studies with requests for written comments may
not be feasible; indeed, that might not protect those interests as effectively
as the machinery which the drafters of the Act showed such rare good
judgment in establishing, namely, consultations with industry advisory
committees. If the advisory committee is well-chosen and well-informed,
and if the officials and members of the committee arrive at mutually
satisfactory courses of action, hearings ought not to be constitutionally
requisite even though some individual somewhere is dissatisfied with the
policies agreed upon.'
I do not say that the trial technique is never appropriate in price-
fixing proceedings. It is indispensable when specific facts are in dispute.
An entire proceeding need not follow the same method throughout;
informal investigatory methods coupled with such a device as a rtpre-
sentative advisory board may be best suited for finding the co- niomic
facts, but a trial will be necessary for finding specific facts where there
is conflicting evidence. Or if disputes on specific facts predominate, the
balance of convenience may be to use a trial technique throughout. The
sole guide should be the practical one of choosing whatever means will
be most efficient in providing to the agency the desired understanding
while at the same time safeguarding private interests. 2
Milk prices provide further illustration. The judicial decisions, as we
have seen, hopelessly conflict: New Jersey permits milk price-fixing
without any hearing,43 Pennsylvania holds nothing short of the trial
technique is sufficient,44 and California is content with public meetings
The New Jersey court seemed to get its result from the theory of separa-
tion of powers; the Pennsylvania court stated an unreasoned conclusion
that "interested parties should be accorded opportunity to test the relia-
41. See Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age (1941) 41 Cw, L.
REv. 589, 596: "Let it not be assumed too easily that hearings are a significant protec-
tion against bureaucratic absolutism. To a slothful administrator a hearing precedent to
regulation may be a God-given opportunity to avoid work and thought. He need only
listen with impassively judicial countenance and then forget all he has heard. It is the
conference with its give and take of ideas and information, with its possibilities of de-
tailed exploration of minor points and hidden corners which stirs the mind to action.
Moreover, there are demonstrably situations where hearings produce little if anything
of value."
42. Most of the foregoing discussion of price ceilings is applicable to the bull, of
the wage proceedings before such agencies as the Fair Labor Standards Administratiun
and the Public Contracts Division of the Department of Labor. See AtCy Gen. Comm.
Ad. Proc., Division of Public Contracts, SE-,. Doc. No. 186, PL 1, 76th Cong., d Sess.
(1940) 30-33; Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Administration of th FaI-r Labor Standards
Act of 1938, SEN. Doc. No. 10, Pt. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 38-40.
43. State ex tel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 X. J. Eq.
504, 179 Atl. 116 (1935).
44. Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm., 332 Pa. 15, 1 A. (2d) 775
(193S).
45. Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P. (2d) 665 (1940).
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bility of the Commission's evidence before an order is promulgated,
revised or changed"; and the California court relied entirely upon its
analysis of other cases, to the exclusion of its own creative effort. I
submit that one cannot apply a mass of legal doctrine to a vague idea
that the function performed is "price-fixing" and come out with a sensible
choice of a procedure pattern for performing that function. A finer
discrimination is necessary.
Milk price-fixing is not all alike. One must inquire into the kind of
materials needed, and their sources, before deciding how to go about
getting those materials. Factual disputes may require the process of
sworn evidence subject to cross-examination, but these are in fact seldom
involved. Milk prices usually are not determined by a proper rate of
return on the valuation of a company's property. The facts ordinarily
relate not to one company but to thousands, from the farmer with a
few cows to the immense dairy farm using mass production methods.
Fixing of milk prices by the federal government has for its objective
the idea of parity, giving farmers the purchasing power they had during
the base period of August, 1919, to July, 1929. Obviously, finding price
levels of the base period is a matter for statistical research, not trial.
The facts do not peculiarly concern one company and seldom is any party
in a position to offer much of value by way of affirmative evidence or
cross-examination or rebuttal. The Dairy Section of the Department
of Agriculture may well prepare an economic brief and invite comments
upon it at a public meeting, as it does, but ordinarily there is no occasion
for allowing cross-examination by adversaries.
Furthermore, as the system operates under the Federal Act, parity
is not the practical basis for prices. "The actual objective, which has
been substantially unchanged since 1934, appears to have been.to establish
the highest producer prices in the market that could be sustained for
any considerable period of time. In the early stages of the program
to have set prices at the prescribed parity levels would have resulted in
such a flow of milk as to have flooded the market and expanded its
area beyond a territory reasonably to be expected to be a continuous
source of supply. These larger supplies would have resulted in subse-
quent lower prices and a difficult process of supply contraction."' 4 In
other words, if I understand this correctly, the ultimate basis for deter-
mining prices is observation of results; the Department feels its way,
increasing the price gradually to accomplish the objectives of the Act,
and studies the consequences as it goes along. Such a process surely
cannot be conducted by methods of the courtroom.
A more definite standard for milk price-fixing is the so-called historical
basis: the average differential between butter prices and the fluid milk
46. WALLACE, TNEC REP., ECONOMIC STANDARDS OF GOVERNMENT PRICE CONTiOL,
Monograph 32 (1941) 84-85.
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price prevailing during the base period is added to current butter prices
to arrive at a current hypothetical price for fluid milk.4 7 If this were
the exclusive standard there might be much occasion for argument but
none for trial. Another standard is the competitive: to the price of milk
for manufacturing at the edge of the milkshed are added transportation
charges to the city, a premuim for quality, a cost of meeting the sani-
tation requirements, charges for special care in handling, and sometimes
a premium for convenience in location.4" Each of these factors, of course,
could be proved with evidence subject to cross-examination, but I should
think that if the Department makes its studies and submits its findings
for oral and written comment by parties it is more likely to produce
a better official understanding of the facts, a more economical e.,pendi-
ture of taxpayers' money, and more ultimate satisfaction to those af-
fected.
In Indiana, although the milk statute provides that prices shall be
"just and reasonable" and that the board shall be guided by (1) cost
of production, (2) value of milk in terms of butter, cheese, and evap-
orated milk, (3) the supply of milk, and (4) the welfare of the general
public, the following statement from an annual report of the board
indicates the basis in practical administration: "The board consistently
follows the plan of consulting local interested parties in each area and
giving them what they ask, provided it is reasonable and fair.""2 The
price for different areas varied from $1.85 to $2.36 per hundredweight,
and the variations could not be explained on the basis of quality or cost
of production. One could hardly say that the board ought to find what
the parties want through conducting a trial. Questionnaires, letters,
conferences, advisory committees, and, at most, public meetings or open
conferences ought to suffice.
In Wisconsin, "custom and bargaining power" were once the basis
for milk prices, and "competition" is now the basis.O To find what
price a marketing cooperative has agreed upon with distributors hardly
calls for a trial. The chief component of "competition" is the price of
products manufactured from milk from outside the area; finding that
price dos not require courtroom methods.
In California, where wholesale and retail prices, as well as producer
prices, are fixed, the director must find "that such prices are not more
than reasonably sufficient to cover all necessary costs, including a reason-
able return upon necessary capital invested, of reasonably efficient dis-
tributors and retail stores." In one area of 49 distributors the director
47. Id. at 85.
4S. Ibid.
49. Id. at 151, quoting Board Report of April, 1938.
50. Id. at 168. Another factor that has been used in Wisconsin is cost of production,
which, if thoroughly developed, is more likely to call for trial methods.
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had cost studies made of four, and based the proposed prices on the
plant with lowest cost of the four, after eliminating unnecessary ex-
penses.5 ' Disputes of fact concerning one of these distributors certainly
would make trial appropriate, but it seems likely that controversy will
normally concern not so much the underlying facts as the application
of principles of cost accounting.
Despite rather sweeping pronouncements from the Supreme Court,
due process probably does not require oral presentation of evidence even
in all public utility rate cases. 2 The category of rate cases is too broad
for uniform application of the same procedure pattern. 3 In its latest
annual report the ICC states: "Approximately 41 per cent of the total
number of formal complaints were handled by the shortened procedure
method as compared with 30, 35, and 34 per cent during the three pre-
ceding years."5 4 Under the shortened procedure the parties exchange
51. Id. at 133.
52. The Morgan cases did involve fixing rates for as many as fifty marketing agen-
cies, and the Court required a trial as a matter of "fair play". Morgan v. United States,
298 U. S. 468 (1936), 304 U. S. 1 (1937). But I do not interpret these cases as author-
ity against my major thesis. The decisive consideration is that the inquiry in these cases
was not into the general facts concerning all fifty agencies. The rates had to be fixed
for each marketing agency, and inquiry had to be made concerning the volume of busi-
ness of each, the number of necessary employees of each, the cost of operating each
business, and the necessary investment in each business. The factual inquiries were
narrow and specific, each party being the primary source of information concerning his
business. Trial methods were therefore appropriate. Of course, emphasis upon written
materials, with a minimization of the oral process, might have been a desirable way of
developing facts about some of the marketing agencies. See the lower court's opinion in
the first Morgan case for a detailed statement of facts. 8 F. Supp. 766 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
53. In the Preliminary Report to the Council and Section of the American Bar Asso-
ciation by the Committee on the Improvement of Procedure in the Trial of Rate Litiga-
tion before State Commissions and the Courts, submitted at the Association's annual
meeting, held in Atlantic City on September 15 and 16, 1931, the following appears:
"The view is widely held that proposals for changes in rates may in at least a large per-
centage of instances be considered by Commissions by much the same approach and in
much the same manner as is followed by fair-minded utility executives. This would in-
volve primarily an examination of the revenue produced by existing rates, changes in
demand for service and in operating expenses, availability of new capital, etc., and a
weighing of such factors with a view to reaching a decision fair to all parties. This,
of course, would mean in those instances an initial procedure far different from that
which would result if formal determination of fair value were actually to be the start-
ing point in rate fixing. And if business fairness to both parties is to furnish a primary
standard in seeking agreement upon acceptable rates, it seems clear that informal confer-
ences and negotiation furnish a more suitable procedure than formal hearings with ex-
amination and cross examination of witnesses. The development of specific measures for
the encouragement of such informal methods of conciliation is thought by some to be a
promising line of advance in the improvement of procedure in rate cases." Such provo-
cative thought as this can hardly be foreclosed by sweeping generalizations about due
process of law.
54. ICC ANN. REP. (1941) 77.
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sworn memoranda of fact and written arguments, and the examiner
prepares a proposed report without the benefit of oral presentation of
evidence. In only about one case in twenty do contradictions of fact
appear in the memoranda, and even then the disputes are usually easily
resolved.
"Controversies in rate cases usually do not concern questions of
truth and falsity, or questions of primary or evidentiary facts.
There is little about which a witness could readily perjure himself.
Most of the facts have already been committed to writing in both
the shipper's records and in the carrier's records, such as the date
of shipment, the charges collected, the weight, the route over which
the shipment moved. The affiants are usually members of the traffic
departments of the carriers who prepare the shipments, and the
officers or employees of the shipping company who have handled
the transportation. Of course, dispensing with hearings means
dispensing with cross-examination, and dispensing with cross-
examination is shocking to some lawyers. But when primary facts
are not in dispute, there is no very convincing reason why the
evidence on each side should not be presented in writing rather than
orally. . . . Some members of the Commission's staff are firmly
of the opinion that the shortened procedure sometimes results in
better decisions than hearing procedures, by reason of the greater
precision that is possible when facts are stated in writing rather
than orally." 15
Although the shortened procedure in the ICC now rests entirely on
consent of parties, the Department of Agriculture has discretion to
require it in certain cases, and much can be said in favor of allowing
the ICC the same discretion.r
Due process certainly must not prematurely foreclose experimentation
with substitution of written for oral methods. A so-called "modified"
procedure in the ICC seems promising.YW The full potentialities of
written methods remain to be explored, and judicial language uttered
without such devices in mind cannot properly be regarded as an obstacle
to sound trial-and-error development 8
55. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commerce Commission, Sm:. Dc. No.
10, Pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 24-25.
56. Compare REPORT (1941) 69.
57. For a summary of what has heretofore been called the modified procedure, sce
ICC ANN. REP. (1924) 7. As of May, 1942, the ICC has under consideration a tentative
draft of rules which prescribe a new modified procedure. The Commission declares: "As
proposed in the instant submission modified procedure . . . would not be dependent utun
consent, and oral hearing would be confined to matters upon which there is disagree-
ment." ICC Proposed Revision of the Rules of Practice (1942) 34. See Brown, Ptul:
Service Commission Procedure-A Problem and a Suggestion (1938) 87 U. or PA. L.
REv. 139.
58. The Attorney General's Committee recommended that "the practice of holding
public hearings . . . should be continued and established as standard administrative prac-
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Separation-of-Powers Classifications as Criteria. An uncritical reading
of judicial opinions on the requirement of opportunity to be heard would
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the trial technique is required for
"judicial" action but not necessarily for "legislative" action."0 Yet a
critical examination of these opinions leads to just as inexorable a con-
clusion that the attachment of separation-of-powers labels to functions
is an evasion rather than a solution of the problem.
Recognition of the difficulty or impossibility of distinguishing legis-
lative from judicial functions is at last becoming commonplace. The
classical statement of Holmes is increasingly rejected: "A judicial in-
quiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist...
Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing
cohditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or som6
part of those subject to its power." 6 It has been observed that "almost
all governmental orders have the characteristic of prescribing or for-
bidding future conduct. A judgment for money damages, an order for
the abatement of a nuisance, and a decree compelling an employer to
bargain collectively with a union must be executed in the future. . . .,01
And courts in creating law frequently look to the future and make new
rules. Perhaps the most successful attempt to classify is that of Professor
Fuchs, who rejects the categories of legislative and judicial, and marks
out a separate category known as rule-making. He offers a useful and
a workable definition: "The most obvious definition of rule-making and
the one most often employed in the literature of administrative law asserts
simply that it is the function of laying down general regulations as
tice" for several categories of cases, including "the fixing of prices and wages." See Rr-
PORT (1941) 107-08. This flat recommendation might well have been qualified. The Com-
mittee approves the shortened procedure as used in the Department of Agriculture. Id.
at 69. And I am confident that it would approve the provisions of the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, setting up industry advisory committees, providing that hearing,
may be eliminated, and providing for limiting proceedings to affidavits, other written
evidence, and briefs.
59. The Harvard Law Review surprisingly relied on separation-of-powers labels i
solving with the greatest of ease the question of requirement of hearings under the Price
Control Act: "While the formal hearing is essential to quasi-administrative action-
'the issuance of orders or findings or the taking of action applying to named or specified
persons or situations'-it can be dispensed with in quasi-legislative action-'the issuance
of regulations or the making of determinations which are addressed to indicated but
unnamed and unspecified persons or situations.' Consequently, since the contemplated
price regulations will be directed to classes and not individuals, their quasi-legislative
nature would seem to allow the EPCA validly to dispense with formal notice and hear-
ing to the effected parties." Comment, American Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 IIAuv.
L. REv. 427, 490-91.
60. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1908).
61. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv.
259, 260.
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distinguished from orders that apply to named persons or to specific
situations."' 62 This seems clearly preferable to the separation-of-powers
classification customarily made by the courts, even though Mr. Fuchs
himself suggests that it has its difficulties. Of course, some governmental
action is usually regarded as legislative even though it is not rule-making
and even though it culminates in orders that apply to named persons
or to specific situations. Thus, a proceeding before the Fariff Corn-
mission concerning the fixing of the duty on nitrates is regarded as
legislative even though there is only one party on one side and two
parties on the other.63 The notion persists that rate-making for a single
company is legislative. It is easy to say that to order a railroad to use
power reverse gears or to eliminate a grade crossing or to abandon a
track or to extend a line is legislative rather than judicial, simply because
such an order has little in common with the kind of business that is
handled by courts. Indeed, I am inclined to think that if one must
classify administrative action along the lines of the legislative and the
judicial by using some one criterion, the most satisfactory test may be
the appeal to tradition: action resembling what courts traditionally do
is judicial and action resembling what legislatures customarily do is
legislative. Thus, a court does not fix duties on imports; legislatures
do; therefore the function when performed by a commission is legis-
lative. Such a form of reasoning is often more helpful than any of
the other tests. But, using any test, what is the inspection of a locomotive
to ascertain whether or not it should be withdrawn from service, or a
proceeding with one named carrier on one side and innumerable un-
named shipper on the other to determine whether or not an exception
to the long-and-short-haul clause should be permitted, or an investiga-
tion of an airplane crash to get information to prevent recurrence of
similar accidents, or approval of giving less than thirty days' notice on
changing rates, or a general investigation of freight forwarding practices
to determine whether some action ought to be taken and if so what?
The label logic of separation-of-powers classification is too often
specious. Why should a particular function of some agency be legis-
lative or judicial? Why not recognize that the categories are largely
survivals of governmental processes having little in common with the
62. Id. at 263.
63. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 238 U. S. 294 (1933). Mr.
Justice Cardozo reasoned that hearings before congressional committees were not trials,
that the function w-as transferred from the committees to the Tariff Commission and the
President, and that "The inference is, therefore, a strong one that the kind of hearing
assured by the statute to those affected by the change is a hearing of the same order as
had been given by congressional committees when the legislative process was in the
hands of Congress and no one else." Id. at 305. I doubt the validity of such reasoning,
although I agree with the result. See infra p. 1115, on differences between legislatures
and agencies with respect to requiring hearings.
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administrative process, and that a modern function may be somewhat
judicial and somewhat legislative but neither wholly one nor wholly the
other?
Furthermore, if we must attach these labels to agencies' functions
(and deeply rooted habits do not suddenly disappear), surely there is
good sense in getting rid of the false and misleading notion that for the
sake of some pretty symmetry a function must be classified the same way
for all purposes. I think that a statute conferring a rate-fixing power
upon a court might well be held unconstitutional on the ground that the
power is legislative, and that at the same time the same judges might
consistently hold that a trial technique must be used by a commission in
fixing rates because rate-fixing is judicial. And so of other powers. In
order to classify wisely, we must know the purpose of the classification,
and a classification appropriate for one purpose may be inappropriate
for another.
Thus, if the purpose of classifying some function is to determine
whether or not the trial technique should be required, the court should
select the appropriate label in accordance with its views on the question
whether or not the function is one that calls for that technique. The pro-
fessed idea about cause and effect must be reversed: instead of saying that
a function is judicial and that therefore a trial is requisite, we should say
that since a trial is desirable we may call the function judicial for this
purpose; or since a trial is unnecessary the action may be dubbed legis-
lative. I believe that more often than not this is the sequence of thought
in the minds of alert judges. A good example is the first Morgan case, 0'
involving the fixing of rates for stockyard services. Chief Justice Hughes
could have gone to the precedents and found that the function was
legislative: in Prentis, Holmes had said that "the establishment of a
rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act
legislative, not judicial" ;"5 in Ben Avon, McReynolds had proclaimed
that "the order here involved . . . was legislative" ;0 and the Chief
Justice himself had declared flatly in St. Joseph only one month before
the first Morgan case that "The fixing of rates is a legislative act."07
But the Chief Justice, wisely, did not go to the precedents and find the
label. He looked to the purpose of the classification: "A proceeding of
this sort requiring the taking and weighing of evidence, determinations
of fact based upon the consideration of the evidence, and the making
of an order supported by such findings, has a quality resembling that of
a judicial proceeding. Hence it is frequently described as a proceeding
of a quasi-judicial character."0 " The Chief Justice did not decide on
64. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936).
65. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1908).
66. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287. 289 (1920).
67. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, S0 (193().
68. 298 U. S. at 480.
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the basis of the label what the procedure should be. The Chief Justice
decided on the basis of the procedure what the label should be. Other
courts would do well to follow this method of reasoning.°9
Of course, if we use this approach in trying to discover when the
trial technique should be required, we get no help from separation-of-
powers concepts, winding up exactly where we started. That is as it
should be. After we find on other bases whether or not the trial tech-
nique should be required, we may then, but only then, say that the label
of a function for this purpose is judicial or legislative or what-not.
The Analogy to Legislative Enactments Vithout Hcarings. Clearly it
does not follow that because a legislature may take certain action with-
out providing opportunity for hearing or other participation by parties
an agency may do likewise.7" A legislature is a representative body whose
members are supposed to and to a large extent do reflect the will of their
constituents. Those affected by a pending measure are not denied oppor-
tunity for participation in the determination, for they are presumably
represented within the legislature itself. This element of representation
is usually lacking in the administrative process. When private parties
tend to obstruct an agency in gaining its objectives, those parties seldom
have spokesmen among the membership of the agency. If their argu-
ments and evidence are to enter into the formulation of the govern-
mental action, special procedural devices must be made available - some-
thing in addition to what a legislature provides. That the legislature is
permitted to act without giving opportunity for hearing is only another
illustration of the thoroughly sound proposition that devices other than
hearings are often superior to hearings as protection against arbitrary
action.
Like a legislature, a municipal government, by reason of its represen-
tative character, may sometimes act without providing opportunity to
be heard even though an administrative body might be required for the
same action to provide such opportunity. Thus, the Supreme Court has
permitted a municipality to require a railroad to eliminate a grade cross-
ing without opportunity for hearing 7 but has set aside for lack of hear-
69. See the similar reasoning of REPORT (1941) 106-07: "Rate fixing for public
utilities has been attended by a high degree of procedural formality . . . In these in-
stances, however, the number of enterprises having their rates fixed in a single proceed-
ing is quite limited, with the consequence that rate fixing has come to be thought of as
adjudication rather than as rule making."
70. This idea that an agency may use any methods a legislature may use runs through
a good many cases. See, e.g., Health Dep't v. Rector, 145 N. Y. 32, 40-41, 39 N. E. 833,
835-36 (1895); Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 365, 194 Pac. 595, 593
(1920). For express rejections of the idea, see Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190,
197 (1933); REPORT (1941) 101.
71. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 77 (1898).
19421 1115
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ing a commission order of the same kind.72 So, in improvement and
assessment cases a legislature or a municipality may determine benefit
to a locality without allowing opportunity for hearing,73 but the Supreme
Court requires an administratiye body to provide such opportunity."1
In cases involving special benefit to particular property owners, the
Supreme Court permits a legislature to make the determination without
opportunity for hearing,75 but not a municipality or county government."0
In a few agencies members represent constituencies as in a legislature.
Thus, the thirty-six members of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board are not government employees but draw their pay from the rail-
roads and railway labor unions.77 Even though disputes are hotly con-
tested, trial is never used. Indeed, in more than half the cases (virtually
all crucial ones) the members of the board deadlock and the decision is
made by a referee to whom the parties may never present evidence and
usually may present neither written briefs nor oral arguments. But in
a substantial sense, on account of the board's representative character,
the parties do have opportunity to influence decisions, for board members
exert every effort to persuade the referee. Were it not for this, denial
of opportunity to be heard before the referee would be unfair, unless
other adequate means of participation were provided.
The National Defense Mediation Board was made up of four em-
ployer representatives, four employee representatives, and three public
representatives, with alternates in proportionate numbers.78 Although
more than two-thirds of the cases were settled by mediation without
formal recommendation by a panel of the board, recommendations were
made in many important cases, and sanctions were applied in such a way
that recommendations were sometimes the equivalent of adjudications.
The Board, with some exceptions, did -not employ trial methods. The
representative character of the Board, the informal hearings in which
mixtures of facts and argument were freely presented, and the pre-
dominant purpose to effect settlements through negotiation and bargain-
ing combined to provide a system far superior to an orthodox trial before
non-partisan officers. And probably most parties found the safeguards
under the Board's system preferable to those provided by trial.
72. Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190 (1933).
73. E.g., Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 306 U. S. 459 (1939).
74. E.g., Browning v. Hooper, 269 U. S. 396 (1926).
75. E.g., Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U. S. 207 (1915).
76. Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30 (1893) ; but cf. Withnell v. Ruecking Constr.
Co., 249 U. S. 63 (1919). See the collection of cases and excellent analysis in GFLLUORN,
ADMNISTRATIWE LAW-CASES AND C0IaENTS (1940) 360-64.
77. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., The National Railroad Adjustinenit Board, SuN.
Doc. No. 10, Pt. 4, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
78. Jaffe and Rice, Report on the Work of the National Defense Mediation Board
(1942) (mimeographed).
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The Number of Parties as a Criterion. Some refusals of opportunity
to be heard rely heavily on the idea that hearings are not feasible when
a large number of parties may be affected. These cases stem from
Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado,"9 which permitted a blanket increase in
valuation of all Denver property without opportunity for taxpayers to
be heard. 1r. Justice Holmes declared for a unanimous Court: "Where
a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable
that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. . . . There
must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government
is to go on."'  The Court distinguished Londoner v. Dcnvcr,"' which
required opportunity to be heard where a local board determined
"whether, in what amount, and upon whom" a tax for paving a street
should be levied for special benefits, on the ground that, "A relatively
small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally af-
fected, in each case upon individual grounds." -82 Other courts, following
this lead, have emphasized the number of parties or have made it the
sole criterion."
Requiring the trial technique in the Londoner case and refusing to
require it in the Bi-Metallic case was thoroughly sound. But the cases
should not be interpreted as supporting the proposition that the require-
ment of a hearing should depend upon the number of parties. The empha-
sis should be upon the "individual grounds". The true test is whether the
facts are general or concern individuals.8 4 If facts concerning the extent
to which X will specially benefit from the improvement are disputed,
those facts peculiarly concern X, and the dispute should not be resolved
without giving X a chance to offer his proof, to know the opposing proof
and argument, and to rebut and cross-examine. But if the dispute is
whether all property valuation should be horizontally raised, the needed
facts do not peculiarly concern any individual and the trial technique
will normally be inappropriate. No matter how numerous the parties,
a trial usually is the expedient device for resolving factual controversies
that relate to an individual, and no matter how few the parties, a trial
is usually unnecessary for developing general facts. The criterion for
using the trial technique thus is not the number of parties. There is,
however, a high correlation between numerous parties and the generality
of the facts, and between few parties and the specificity of the facts;
79. 239 U. S. 441 (1915). Contra: Draffen v. Paducah, 215 Ky. 139, 234 S. AV. 10-
(1926); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Board, 119 Neb. 138, 227 N. W. 452 (1929).
so. 239 U. S. at 445.
81. 210 U. S. 373 (1908).
82. 239 U. S. at 446.
83. Hammond v. Winder, 100 Ohio St. 433, 126 N. E. 409 (1919); Common Coun-
cil of City of Watertown v. Dep't of Finance, 59 S. D. 573, 241 N. NV. 731 (1932);
Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 500, 540, 215 Pac. 257, 270 (1923).
84. See discussion of fixing rates, prices, and wages, supra p. 1103 ef seq.
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accordingly courts which make the number of parties the criterion usually
reach a good result.
Another aspect of the interpretation often given the Bi-Metallic case
is questionable. A courtroom type of proceeding to determine whether
all property valuation in Denver should be increased would be clumsy,
expensive, and inefficient, and the Court properly denied the opportunity.
But the taxpayers should not be denied all opportunity to reach the eyes
and ears of the board. The board might announce what action it con-
templates, with a statement of supporting reasons, and invite written
comments; or it might permit limited arguments to be made at a public
meeting hearing. To assure informed action and to give taxpayers the
satisfaction which comes from a chance to influence decision, opportunity
for some such participation is desirable, even though constitutional
principles may not require it. The reasons behind the democratic principle
are applicable.
The notion that hearing cannot or should not be attempted when
parties are numerous is false. Agencies have held hearings in as many
as twenty-five cities on a single question. The ICC has had four or five
hearings on the same question progressing simultaneously in a Chicago
hotel. I find no trace of breakdown of any hearing on account of too
many parties. What happens in practice is that the more numerous the
parties the more general the inquiry and the less each individual has to
contribute and hence the fewer the individuals who attend. Indeed, when
large groups lack organization making possible effective participation
through representatives, the agency's problem is often the reverse of
overcrowding the hearing room. The agency discovers that calling a
hearing for few or none is less effective than submitting questionnaires,
or proposing tentative regulations and inviting written comments, or
consulting with representative advisory committees. And sometimes par-
ticipation must be made even easier; when the ICC wanted to under-
stand the problems and points of view of little motor carriers who keep
books in their hip pockets, the Commission sent out a representative to
interview thousands of such individuals."s
Privileges and Property Rights. The cases are legion which assert
that privileges may be taken away without opportunity for hearing but
that property rights are protected by due process and may not be adversely
affected without opportunity to be heard. Typical is the following:
"The operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways is not a
natural right, nor is license to do so a contract, or property right, in
a constitutional sense. It is merely a conditional privilege which may
85. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commerce Cononission, SEN. Doc. No.
10, Pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 85-86.
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be suspended or revoked . . . even without a notice or an opportunity
to be heard."" 6 Similar language is often used in cases involving revo-
cation of licenses for automobile drivers,87 dance halls,8" pool rooms,89
liquor dealers," milk dealers,"' lobster fishers,9 - theaters. 3  But when
more dignified callings are involved, this is apt to be typical: "Whether
the right to practice law or medicine is property, in the technical sense,
it is a valuable franchise, and one of which a person ought not to be
deprived, without being offered an opportunity, by timely notice, to
defend it.""4
So striking is the difference in language in the two types of cases that
one commentator has thus summarized the law:
"If a given occupation be calculated to serve some useful pur-
pose advantageous to the general public or any considerable number
thereof, and if the pursuit of such occupation affords but slight,
if any, opportunity for the infliction of general and substantial in-
jury to the public health, safety, morals or convenience, then a
license to engage in such occupation confers upon its holder a right
which cannot be divested without notice to him and opportunity
for him to be heard; but if an occupation be one which serves no
socially useful purpose or which affords opportunity to jeopardize
or injure the health, safety, morals, or convenience of large numbers
of people, then a license to engage therein is, at most, a mere
privilege, and is subject, due cause being shown, to summary revo-
cation in the public interest.""
Certainly one may readily agree that whenever a disputed question of
specific fact is involved a doctor, lawyer or other professional man
should not be deprived of his right to practice without opportunity for
86. Nulter v. State Road Comm., 119 W. Va. 312. 317-18, 193 S. E. 549, 552 (1937).
87. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 473, 9 A. (2d) 403, 410 (1939) ; La Plante
v. State Board of Pub. Roads, 47 R. I. 258, 261, 131 At. 641, 643 (1926) ; Law. v. Com-
monwealth, 171 Va. 449, 454, 199 S. E. 516, 519 (1938).
88. People ex reL Ritter v. Wallace, 160 App. Div. 787, 7S9, 145 X. Y. Supp. 1041,
1042 (2d Dep't 1914).
89. Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 'Mass. 578, 579 (1M2).
90. State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 42 P. (2d) 1076, 1077 (Cal. App.
1935); Dorley Apt. Co. v. Springer, 22 A. (2d) 397, 401 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1941); Flocel:
v. Bureau of Revenue, 100 P. (2d) 225 (N. M. 1940).
91. People ex reL Lodes v. Dep't of Health, 1,9 N. Y. 137, 191-92, 82 X. E.
187 (1907).
92. State v. Cote, 122 Me. 450, 451, 120 Atl. 538, 538-39 (1923).
93. Thayer Amusement Corp. v. Moulton, 7 A. (2d) 6S2, 06-89 (R. I. 1939); Mc-
Kenzie v. McClellan, 62 Misc. 342, 344, 116 N. Y. Supp. 645, t4 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
94. People v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 297, 17 N. E. 786, 703 (183S). See collection uf
cases and analysis in GE.iLEoR, op. cit. supra note 76, at 372-82.
95. Tuttrup, Necessity of Notice and Hcaring in the Revocation of Occupational
Licenses (1927) 4 Wis. L. REV. 180, 186.
19421 1119
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
hearing. 6 But can one justify taking away the right to pursue other
lawful callings without affording opportunity to be heard upon such
disputed fact questions? I think not. If the holder of an occupational
license is charged with unlawful conduct which he denies, the fact ques-
tion is precisely the kind that lends itself to determination through the
traditional process of testimony of witnesses subject to cross-examina-
tion, and unless some special reason exists for dispensing with the trial
technique the question ought to be determined by that method. The
idea of privilege does not constitute such a special reason but is an
artificial abstraction founded upon an unsound conceptualism. Oper-
ating a motion picture theater or pop-corn stand or billiard parlor is
no more a mere privilege than -practicing law or medicine; all are law-
ful callings which involve varying investments and which are important
to the individuals who pursue them. If taking away the license of the
doctor or lawyer without opportunity for hearing is unjust, revoking
a driver's license or that of a dance hall operator without opportunity
for hearing is likewise unjust. True, the state may prohibit callings
regarded with disfavor, but to reason from that proposition to the
conclusion that administrative officers may take away important interests
without opportunity to be heard on disputed fact questions is a non-
sequitur. To prohibit some occupation altogether involves no unfair-
ness; to allow an administrative officer to destroy a profitable business
on the ground of an alleged unlawfulness which is disputed, without
allowing the owner a chance to know the charges and to meet them with
evidence and argument, involves unfairness apparent to any eyes not
blinded by dazzling conceptualism. To find that alert judges would
permit such injustice would be amazing.
Indeed, a careful reading of the cases reveals that the holdings, as
distinguished from the language, seldom produce such injustice. The
commentator above quoted relies upon fourteen cases reciting that privi-
leges may be withdrawn without opportunity for hearing. Five per-
mitted revocation of licenses on the basis of previous convictions in
court ;9T this result is entirely appropriate, unless it affirmatively appears,
as it did not in any of these cases, that the fact of previous conviction
is disputed. In two others a hearing had been held.18  In three there
was either opportunity for de novo judicial review or the court itself
96. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926) held
opportunity for hearing constitutionally requisite for barring attorney from practice be-
fore the Board.
97. State ex rel. Nowotny v. Milwaukee, 140 Wis. 38, 121 N. W. 658 (1909); Mar-
tin v. State, 23 Neb. 371, 36 N. W. 554 (1888) ; Cassidy v. City of Macon, 133 Ga. 689,
66 S. E. 941 (1909); Sprayberry v. Atlanta, 87 Ga. 120, 13 S. E. 197 (1891); People
v. Myers, 95 N. Y. 223 (1884).
98. Klafter v. Examiners, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N. E. 193 (1913) ; State ex rel. Chapman
v. Board, 34 Minn. 387 (1885).
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in passing upon the hearing question found the disputed facts." In
one case, not an individual license but the revocation of licenses of all
"jitney" buses in a city was involved, and the action was preceded by
public meetings;100 when the facts are general and do not peculiarly
concern individual parties, and when the primary question is one not
of fact but of policy, a trial is ill-adapted to the problem and should
not be used unless specific facts are disputed which may as a practical
matter best be resolved by the process of testimony under oath and sub-
ject to cross-examination. This case is therefore sound in its holding,
despite the court's language about privilege.
. The remaining three of the fourteen cases rest in holding upon privi-
lege. The Nevada court relied upon privilege and the protection afforded
by requiring a unanimous vote of the city council in revoking a liquor
license.'' The Massachusetts court reasoned: "A licensee takes his
license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose,
and one of the statutory conditions of this license was that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure."'0 2 The Rhode Island court
likewise was persuaded by the notion that a license could reserve the
power of revocation without opportunity for hearing. 0" This approach
does have its appeal, especially since the only question is one of due
process; the state need not grant any liquor or poolroom licenses, and,
therefore, it may constitutionally grant licenses with the understanding
that they may be summarily revoked. Nevertheless, I think it is unwise
to allow administrative officers to destroy business interests without an
opportunity for hearing when facts concerning the licensee's past conduct
are disputed.:' 4
The privilege cases discussed are old, and it has been suggested that
"recent cases may indicate a changed attitude toward such licenses."105
Unfortunately, however, the privilege concept is deeply imbedded in
judicial expression and is still decisive of some cases. Thus, since 1935
many licenses have been branded privileges revocable without opportunity
99. People ex tel. Lodes v. Dep't of Health, lS) N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907);
People ex rel Ritter v. Wallace, 160 App. Div. 787, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1041 (2d Dep't
1914).
100. Burgess v. City of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 12( N. E 456 (1920).
101. Wallace v. Mayor of Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 Pac. 523 (1903).
102. Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 57S, 579 (1&2).
103. Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230, 21 At. 539 (1891').
104. Of course, our primary quarrel might well be with the statutes and ordinances
which establish such a scheme rather than with the courts which allow it under due
process clauses. But in this observation lies a significant point: when courts having
power to give content to due process clauses refuse to disapprove administrative methods,
even when the ground is some such conceptualism as that surrounding the privilege idea,
legislators and administrators easily get the erroneous impression that the courts are
approving those methods, with the result that a deficient system remains unimproved.
105. Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 332, 339 n. 47.
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to be heard - drivers' licenses in Pennsylvania, Virginia and West
Virginia," 6 a license to show motion pictures in Rhode Island, 1° liquor
licenses in California, New Mexico, and Delaware.""8 Although most
of the results can be justified on other grounds, the danger that the
doctrine of privilege will produce injustice is illustrated by a 1941 Dela-
ware decision."" The Liquor Commission "suspended for a stated
period" a hotel's license to sell liquor, on the ground of alleged violation
of a regulation against drinking after a certain hour. In upholding the
Commission's action despite lack of opportunity for hearing the court
reasoned that the license "is not property" but "a mere temporary
permit . . . to do that which otherwise would be unlawful." Whether
or not there was a substantial dispute of fact -the crucial considera-
tion- does not appear. For all that does appear, the Commission may
have been acting upon indirect information which the lhotel, if given
the opportunity, could readily have disproved. And if the facts were
disputed, the question is precisely the kind for which trial methods are
designed. To give the hotel opportunity to know the evidence against
it and the opportunity, however informal, to meet that evidence, would
have caused little delay, slight expense, no substantial prejudice to the
public interest, and at the same time would have protected against the
kind of arbitrary official action that promotes distrust of government.
In other contexts the same concept of privilege recurs. Thus Congress
can exclude all aliens, 11° or cease to provide the second-class mailing
privilege at less than the cost of the service, 11' or deny compensation to
veterans," 2 or discontinue workmen's compensation benefits for federal
employees, or curtail the importation of goods from abroad."' The
states may deny unemployment compensation or old-age assistance or
direct relief or other benefits in the nature of bounties.1 4 True, such
106. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A. (2d) 408 (1939) ; Law v. Common-
wealth, 171 Va. 449, 199 S. E. 516 (938); Nulter v. State Road Comm., 119 W. Va.
.12, 193 S. E. 549 (1937).
107. Thayer Amusement Corp. v. Moulton, 7 A. (2d) 682 (R. I. 1939).
108. State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. (2d) 374, 42 P. (2d) 1076
(1935) ; Darling Apt. Co. v. Springer, 22 A. (2d) 397 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Flocck v.
Bureau of Revenue, 100 P. (2d) 225 (N. M. 1940).
109. Darling Apt. Co. v. Springer, 22 A. (2d) 397 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1941).
110. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892), upheld exclusion of an alien with-
out opportunity for hearing, even though the exclusion was based upon facts concerning
the individual which were disputed. The Court relied upon absence of statutory require-
ment of hearing and the idea of sovereign power to forbid entrance of foreigners. Cf.
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908) granting writ of habeas corpus because
of lack of opportunity to be heard.
111. Compare Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 507 (1904).
112. Compare Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 587 (1934).
113. Compare Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310 (1890) ; Oceanic Steam Nay. Co.
v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 335 (1909).
114. I do not advocate formal hearings in the administration of old age assistance,
direct relief, WPA jobs, and the like. But the reason is not that the recipients are get-
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benefits often may be denied altogether, without opportunity for hear-
ing, when the governmental action rests upon general facts and policy.
But when the decision involves disputed facts concerning an individual
-his qualifications or circumstances or past conduct- that individual
normally should be given a chance to know the evidence adverse to his
interest and to meet it with evidence and argument. A procedure which
is unfair for inflicting a penalty is not rendered fair by using it for
withdrawing a benefit. If the government or a state chooses to provide
benefits, even outright gifts, the method of determining the individual
recipients must still be fair.
Furthermore, what would be gratuities if given by any other donor
are not entirely gratuities when provided by the Government, for they
are paid for by taxation in which donees in varying degrees share. The
language of M%1r. Justice Brandeis is broadly applicable to all these ques-
tions: "The contention that, because the rates are non-compensatory,
use of the second-class mail is not a right Eut a privilege which may be
granted or withheld at the pleasure of Congress, rests upon an entire
misconception, when applied to individual members of a class. The fact
that it is largely gratuitous makes clearer its position as a right; for
it is paid for by taxation.""
The Government, surprisingly, awards workmen's compensation bene-
fits to its own employees through a system which does not provide for
hearings in finding controverted facts; even informal conferences are
rare."' I suppose the privilege idea might be invoked to justify the
ting privileges; the reason is that the problems are better handled by informal investiga-
tions. Nevertheless, where facts are disputed a claimant should be allowed to know the
findings in support of an adverse decision and given a chance to show informally that
the findings are in error. Even if the Government is regarded as a donor (which many
question), still it is a Government, and a Government should follow fair methods.
115. Brandeis, J., dissenting, Milxaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 417,
433 (1921). But cf. Brandeis, J., concurring in St. Joseph Stock-yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U. S. 38, 73, 77 (1936) : "When dealing with constitutional rights (as dis-
tinguished from privileges accorded by the Government, United States v. Babcock, 250
U. S. 328, 331) there must be the opportunity of presenting in an appropriate proceeding,
at some time, to some court, every question of law raised . . ."
Government counsel had the audacty to argue very recently that "no individual has
a natural or constitutional right to have his communications delivered by the Postal
establishment of the government, and hence that a fraud order may be issued summar-
ily and without any notice or any hearing." Happily, the court rejected the contention,
declaring: "Whatever may have been the voluntary nature of the postal system in the
period of its e.'ablishment, it is now the main artery through which the business, social,
and personal affairs of the people are conducted and upon which depends in a greater
degree than upon any other activity of government the promotion of the general welfare."
Pike v. Walker, 121 F. (2d) 37, 38-39 (App. D. C. 1941), cort. dcnicd, 314 U. S. xvi
(1941), rehearing denied, 314 U. S. .xxvi (1941); 50 Yuu L. J. 1479.
116. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., United Slates Employces' Compenmation Cou:nris-
sioU, SEx. Djc. No. 10, Pt. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 53.
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existing system. The Attorney General's Committee, however, perceived(some meagure of inefficiency as well as unfairness both to the Govern-
ment . . . and to the Federal employees who lodge the claim.""" The
Committee recommended retention of informal methods, including con-
ferences, but wisely declared: "If the conference does not dispose of
the case, the dissatisfied employee should be entitled to a hearing . . ." 8
A curious wrinkle in the application of the idea of privilege occurs
in the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation." 9 For violations
of navigation laws and regulations, statutes provide fines, but the Secre-
tary is given power to "remit or mitigate". The fines originally assessed
are always the maximum allowed by statute. Many fines are remitted,
and nearly all are mitigated. Thus, fines in one class of case were
assessed during one year in the aggregate amount of $493,235 but were
mitigated to an aggregate of $75,621. The remissions and mitigations
are determined entirely by informal methods, although de novo judicial
review is theoretically available. The idea held by some of the Bureau's
officers that in remitting or mitigating they are conferring special favors
is mischievous, for in effect the injustice is the same when an officer
unfairly refuses to mitigate a $500 fine to $50 as it is when an officer
in the first instance unfairly imposes a fine of $500 instead of $50.
In both cases the question is what amount the violator shall pay; in
neither case is the idea of privilege or special favor soundly applicable.
Closely analogous is the problem concerning enemy aliens in the
present war. Those found by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
be disloyal are arrested and imprisoned, and then given summary hear-
ings before Enemy Alien Boards, without the right of cross-examina-
tion. It is said in justification of denying cross-examination that the
Government may imprison all enemy aliens and that hearings are given
as a matter of grace to determine, not whether or not the aliens shall
be imprisoned, but whether or not they shall be released. Such reason-
ing is specious. Of course, for practical reasons the Boards which
determine whether aliens should be released or imprisoned may well
yield to the necessities of the situation and abridge some rights that
normally would be accorded. But the question whether or not practical
considerations require dispensing with fair procedure should be squarely
faced; the idea of privilege should not be allowed to confuse the issue.
In about half the states paroles and conditional pardons may be
revoked without opportunity for hearing, and in at least five probation
117. REPoRT (1941) 166.
118. Ibid. Other glaring instances of what I regard as unfair treatment of federal
employees are the many recent discharges for "subversive" activities, without opportunity
to be heard, and without opportunity to know the nature of findings of the F. B. I. See
Gesell and Horsky, Red-Baiting in Washington (1942) 106 NEvw Rrrun. 791.
119. See Atty Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Marine
Inspection and Navigation, SEN. Doc. No. 186, Pt. 10, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1941) 24-28.
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may be so revoked." ° The decisions often rest upon the conception that
the statute or the release itself may reserve the right of summary revo-
cation because the release of the prisoner is a matter of grace.' 2 ' A
courageous Circuit Court of Appeals, in the face of an amazing array
of cases against it, recently rejected this idea and held that reservation
of power to revoke a conditional pardon without opportunity for hear-
ing is a deprivation of due process of Iaw. 1 2 Professor Weihofen
warmly commends the decision in a keen analysis which explodes the
notion that probation, parole and conditional pardon are acts of grace.
He concludes: "In short, a chance to be heard before revocation of a
conditional release, is from the standpoint of penal administration,
good practice, and from the standpoint of the prisoner, a constitutional
right."=
Inspection, Examination and Testing as Substitutes for Hearings. In
one class of cases special problems concerning opportunity for hearing
arise because hearings are inferior to inspection, examination, or testing.
The way to ascertain airworthiness of an airplane or seaworthiness of
a vessel or safe condition of a locomotive is for a skilled inspector to
look at the object and make his decision. And the same is true of in-
specting perishable commodities, quarantining plants, determining the
skill of applicants for various kinds of licenses, ascertaining obscenity
of a periodical, censoring motion pictures.
The Attorney General's Committee recognizes this:
"The surest way to ascertain what is the grade of grain is for a
skilled inspector to test it; the best way to discover whether the
radio equipment of a ship is in proper working order is for a radio
mechanic to examine it and test it. The soundest procedure in cases
of this type is that which recognizes the reality that the inspection
or test is and must be the decisive element. Once that is recognized,
the improvement of procedure is in the direction of protecting the
making of the inspection or test itself, and constantly checking the
skill and integrity of the inspector who in this situation is, after all,
the adjudicator. Protection, in cases such as these, can be afforded
by a right to reexamination or reinspection by another and more
experienced inspector, far more than by any right to a formal hear-
ing before an official who must merely listen to testimony. 'l 4
But how do the courts react to a substitution of inspections and tests
for hearings? May vital interests of liberty and property be permanently
120. 4 Arr'y G x. Su vEy ov R zaSE PROCEMS (1939) 245.
121. Several dozen cases are collected in WVeihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or
Pardon Without Hearing (1942) 32 J. CruM. L. & CRmumroLOw" 531, 532.
122. Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
123. Weihofen, supra note 121, at 539.
124. REPORT (1941) 37-38.
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altered without giving the affected person a chance to present evidence
and argument to the officer who takes the decisive action?
If a general answer is discoverable in the mass of relevant decisions,
it is that the administrative determination may usually be made without
opportunity for hearing when judicial remedies for improper action
remain open or when the court which passes upon the hearing question
finds the administrative action proper in the circumstances. Rare are
decisions which do not in some way lean on judicial findings. Thus,
in the leading North American... case the Supreme Court refused to
enjoin the destruction, without opportunity for hearing, of allegedly
putrid poultry, but observed: "If a party cannot get his hearing in
advance of the seizure and destruction he has the right to have it after-
ward, which right may be claimed upon the trial in an action brought
for the destruction of his property, and in that action those who destroyed
it can only successfully defend if the jury shall find the fact of unwhole-
someness as claimed by them."'2 0 The decision does not deny hearing
on the question of wholesomeness; it denies administrative hearing in
advance of destruction but allows judicial hearing on that question
after destruction. The same is true of the leading Copcutt'2 7 case, in
which the New York Court of Appeals approved summary abatement
of dams alleged to be nuisances, for the court was careful to point out
that the owner may be protected by injunction or action for damages,
and that the defendant board "act at their peril". Even in the much-
cited Lawton v. Steele,"" holding constitutional a summary destruction
of fifteen fish-nets worth $15 each, 2 ' the Court relied not only upon
trivial value but also upon the declaration that if the nets were not
improperly used the owner "may replevy his nets from the officer seizing
them, or if they have been destroyed, may have his action for their
value." 180
In all these cases, and others like them, the assumption is that the
judicial inquiry after the event will determine the correctness of the
administrative action. A substantial body of authority would limit
judicial inquiry to the question of the reasonableness of the adminis-
trative action, so that the defendant officer in a damages action would
not be liable to the plaintiff owner for a reasonable mistake. 13' But the
125. North Amer. Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908).
126. Id. at 316.
127. People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893).
128. 152 U. S. 133 (1894).
129. The plaintiff sued for $525-$35 for each net.
130. 152 U. S. 133, 142 (1894).
131. Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883) ; Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N. Y. 493, 116
N. E. 355 (1917). Stason declares: "The trend in the judicial decisions is probably
leading away from the imposition of liability upon the officer who acts in good faith
but who nevertheless makes a mistake of fact and as a result of such mistake takes action
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reasonableness test seems to crop out only in the damages actions after-
wards; in actions to prevent destruction the assumption is uniformly
made that the owner's remedy for an improper administrative decision
is an action for damages in which inquiry into correctness of the admin-
istrative decision will be made.
1 32
Other cases approving administrative action without opportunity for
hearing are weakened as authorities to the extent that they rest upon
a judicial finding or an admission or a lack of challenge of the cor-
rectness of the administrative finding. In Er parte Lcis,1" a woman
arrested in a house of prostitution was detained in a hospital after
medical examination revealed syphilis and gonorrhea. Despite lack of
opportunity for hearing, the court denied habeas corpus. This may
seem a dangerous precedent- one may be deprived of personal liberty
without hearing and in addition be denied the right of habeas corpus.
But the case was presented on an agreed statement of facts that the
woman was properly detained if the ordinance was valid; she admitted
she was diseased. The practical question before the court thus was
whether or not to release a woman who admittedly had syphilis and
gonorrhea. To hold that one who admits the allegations may be detained
without opportunity for hearing is one thing; to hold that one who
challenges the allegations may be detained without opportunity for hear-
ing is quite another. The court that decided Ex parte Lcwis may quite
consistently hold that a petitioner for habeas corpus who denies the
disease is entitled either to administrative hearing or to a hearing on
habeas corpus which will inquire into the existence of the disease.
Ex parte Brown134 is in every respect like Ex parte Lewis except that
the petitioner for habeas corpus did not specifically admit the disease;
however, the petitioner did not deny the disease and limited her case to
challenging constitutionality. Failure to deny is the important factor,
and the decision is not authority that one who denies the alleged dis-
ease may be detained without opportunity for hearing.
outside his powers and causes damage to persons or to private property." See Srso::,
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ox ADMINIsRATIVE TRIBUNALS (1937) 539. See Jen-
nings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers (1937) 21 M1mxx. L. R n 23; Gua.-
HORUN, op. cit. suPra note 76, at 402-14.
132. If one could start from scratch, without state constitutional doctrine about sover-
eign immunity and other legal dogma standing in the way. I think this conclusion might
be reached: When the state inspector acting in good faith makes a reasonable mistake
and destroys a steer he wrongly believes to have anthrax, it should be held that the in-
spector may act without a hearing, that the inspector is not personally liable for the
mistake, but that the owner may recover the value of the steer from the state. And so of
similar cases. For further discussion of reliance on judicial review that is not dc novo,
see infra p. 1137.
133. 328 Mo. 843, 42 S. NV. (2d) 21 (1931).
134. 103 Neb. 540, 172 N. W. 522 (1919).
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Many decisions lean on admission, lack of challenge, or judicial
finding. 3 ' One court allowed destruction of "a musical slot machine"
without opportunity for hearing, but pointedly observed that the plain-
tiff's demurrer had admitted that the machine was a gambling device
having no legitimate use. 36 When the Supreme Court upheld summary
destruction of milk from cows not tested for tuberculosis, the plaintiff
had admitted his cows were untested, and the Court further stated that
plaintiff's "allegation is, not that his cows are free from infectious or
contagious disease, but only 'so far as he is able to learn or discover'." 187
The Georgia court permitted destruction of liquor without opportunity
for hearing but stressed the plaintiff's admission that the amount ex-
ceeded the legal limit. 3 8 Missouri police seized a "rotary merchandiser"
and the court permitted its destruction without hearing, but empha-
sized that the owner himself in his petition described the machine as
a gambling device.' 9 An Ohio decision denied damages for summary
destruction of nets, but the plaintiff limited his case to the constitutional
question, making no assertion that the nets were being used legally.1 40
135. In addition to those discussed below, see Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188
(1925); Hislop v. Rodgers, 54 Ariz. 101, 92 P. (2d) 527 (1939); Porter v. Lewiston,
41 Idaho 324, 238 Pac. 1014 (1925), error disnissed, 270 U. S.671 (1926) ; Gray v. Thone,
196 Iowa 532, 194 N. W. 961 (1923); Nelson v. Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N. W.
445 (1910); Lemon v. Rumsey, 108 W. Va. 242, 150 S. E. 725 (1929).
136. Board v. Wagner, 93 Md. 182, 48 Atl. 455 (1901).
137. Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 583 (1913).
138. Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561 (1917).
139. State ex rel. Igoe v. Joynt, 341 Mo. 788, 110 S. W. (2d) 737 (1937).
140. State v. French, 71 Ohio St. 186, 73 N. E. 216 (1905). The celebrateal Local
Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A. C. 120, is directly in point. The Borough Coun-
cil issued an order prohibiting use of a house of which Arlidge was lessee's assignee,
until rendered fit. On appeal to the Local Government Board, a public inquiry [hearing]
was held before an inspector designated by the Board, but Arlidge did not appear or
tender evidence. The Board confirmed the order. Arlidge applied to the council to ter-
minate the order, the council refused, and Arlidge again appealed to the Board, which
directed that a second public local inquiry be held before the inspector. Arlidge was pres-
ent with his solicitor and witnesses. "The respondent's [Arlidge's] solicitor argued his
case, and the respondent and his witnesses gave evidence." The inspector submitted his
report to the Board, together with a shorthand note of the evidence and speeches. The
Board "intimated" to Arlidge that it would be wlling to consider any further state-
ment in writing which he desired to submit, but Arlidge did not avail himself of thin
opportunity. The report of the inspector, who had inspected the premises personally, was
not revealed to Arlidge. The Secretary of the Board made affidavit that the Board
decided after full consideration of the reports of the inspector, and of the evidence and
documents, including observations and objections put forward in correspondence by so-
licitors of Arlidge. The House of Lords found no violation of "natural justice".
I cannot agree with those who are shocked by the decision, although making the
inspector's report available to Arlidge would have been better practice. The unfavorable
reception in this country seems to me due in part to misunderstanding. For instance,
Dean Pound misstates the case: "The Board had quietly sent an inspector down there
to look at the house; the inspector had made a report of the condition in which he found
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State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court'4 ' upheld the constitutionality
of administrative determination of disputed facts by examination, with-
out opportunity for hearing, even when all judicial review was with-
drawn, and even though personal liberty was at stake. The statute
provided: "In case of the question arising as to whether or not any
person is affected or is sick with a dangerous, contagious or infectious
disease, the opinion of the health officer shall prevail until the state board
of health can be notified, and then the opinion of the executive officer
of the state board of health, or any member or physician he may appoint
to examine such case, shall be final."'M After arrest for violating an
ordinance, Williams was turned over to the Seattle health commissioner
for examination, found to have syphilis, and committed to the city
isolation hospital. He appealed to the state board of health, which
affirmed. On petition for habeas corpus the lower court appointed three
physicians to examine Williams, but the commissioner applied to the
Supreme Court for writ of prohibition against further proceedings. The
court granted the writ, declaring: "The provision that the finding of
the health officers shall be final is a sufficient evidence of legislative intent
to leave the whole matter to the health officers without restraint on the
part of courts."' 43 The result was that Williams was confined, with-
out opportunity for either judicial or administrative hearing, even though
he specifically alleged "that he is being held on a pretended claim vexa-
tiously instigated by some police officer . . . ; that such charge is un-
founded and in fact untrue."1''
Whatever the merits of the McBride decision, the result is unusual
and probably does not represent the prevailing law. 4  Still, both pros
and cons deserve consideration. The pros: the only fact question pre-
sented was whether Williams had syphilis. The best way to find out
is by medical examination. The question was not left to unchecked
determination of a single doctor, but the statute provided an appeal to
the executive officer of the state board of health or his appointee, pre-
sumably a doctor wholly independent of the commissioner. The question
is a medical one and doctors' methods - not those of the lawyer - are
it, the local Government Board had looked at the report, and, accepting that report as
sufficient, had rejected the appeal." Nowhere in Dean Pound's lengthy statement of the
case does it appear that a hearing was held at which Arlidge submitted evidence and his
solicitors offered argument, or that the Board considertd the transcript of evidence.
Pound, The Growth of Administrative Justice (1924) 2 Wxs. L. Rzv. 321, 323.
141. 103 Wash. 409, 174 Pac. 973 (1918).
142. Id. at 414-15, 174 Pac. at 975.
143. Id. at 424, 174 Pac. at 978.
144. Id. at 411, 174 Pac. at 974.
145. Wragg v. Griffin, 185 Iowa 243, 170 N. W. 400 (1919) holds due process vio-
lated by a statute authorizing local boards of health "upon a suspicion" to emxamine for
venereal disease, but the ground is substantive.
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appropriate. If the safeguard provided by the appeal is insufficient, it
may be improved upon, but hearing methods are inappropriate. The
cons: a hearing affords protection that a private examination cannot
afford- a hearing, by reason of its public nature subjects deciding offi-
cers to potential criticism. Arbitrary action is less likely if the officer
knows that the record of his decision may be examined by others. To
let Williams' own physician make examination, and to require the
official doctors to justify their findings before a judge in the presence
of Williams' own doctor will assure that clearly improper action will
not stand.
Cases like Williams v. Smith 40 are probably of a different stamp.
There, an Indiana statute required each state institution to appoint, in
addition to its regular physician, two surgeons of recognized ability, to
examine the mental and physical condition of "confirmed criminals,
idiots, rapists and imbeciles". "If, in the judgment of this committee
of experts and the board of managers, procreation is inadvisable and
there is no probability of improvement of the mental condition of the
inmate, it shall be lawful for the surgeons to perform such operation
for the prevention of procreation as shall be decided safest and most
effective." The court held the statute unconstitutional, in that "the
prisoner has no opportunity to cross-examine the experts who decide
that this operation should be performed upon him. He has no chance
to bring experts to show that it should not be performed; nor has he a
chance to controvert the scientific question that he is of a class desig-
nated in the statute."' 147 The decision is sound. The administrative
determination requires far more than mere physical examination to find
presence or absence of disease or deficiency; it entails exercise of broad
discretion involving not only controversial scientific questions but also
ethical problems on which reasonable minds may differ. And the method
of hearing is practically well suited to the determination
4 s
The decisions in the inspection, examination and testing cases, con-
sidered broadly, withstand successfully a critical study. The courts
146. 190 Ind. 526, 131 N. E. 2 (1921) ; and see In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala.
543, 162 So. 123 (1935).
147. 190 Ind. 526, 527, 131 N. E. 2.
148. Paducah v. Hook Amusement Co., 257 Ky. 19, 77 S. W. (2d) 383 (1934), held
unconstitutional summary destruction of equipment used for dance marathons. Although
the court's reasoning is based on procedural due process, one may conjecture that sub-
stantive aspects of the ordinance were influential. The same may be said of McConnell
v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505 (1904), holding unconstitutional a statute allow-
ing game wardens to seize summarily equipment used in hunting without a license. One
of the most extreme cases I have seen is People v. Marquis, 291 Ill. 121, 125 N. E. 757
(1920), holding unconstitutional the confiscation of a truck used for hauling liquor, on
the ground the statute failed to provide hearing for the owner, even though the owner
was in fact given a hearing and the driver was tried and convicted. Compare Goldsmith-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 (1921).
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permit- even encourage- administrative action to be taken on the
basis of inspection, examination, or testing without opportunity for
hearing, but the judges nevertheless provide in nearly all cases some
sort of judicial remedy or judicial assurance against arbitrary action.
The net effect is that probably well over ninety per cent- perhaps more
than ninety-nine per cent- of the fact questions presented are deter-
mined finally by direct methods, keeping judicial methods in reserve for
extreme cases. The only troublesome question raised is whether or not
in a situation such as that in the McBride case opportunity for judicial
determination may be cut off.
Despite the awkwardness of judicial methods for these cases, it is
hard to quarrel with retention of the reserve power in the judges. Cer-
tainly the potentiality of judicial hearing afterwards does not in practice
impair efficiency of the system taken as a whole. Usually the party
adversely affected by the results of an inspection or examination is
satisfied with the findings and does not request a hearing. Although
gradings of grain are by statute only prima facie evidence in court, the
gradings have not been questioned in court in 23 years.' 0 Of thousands
of inspections of vessels since 1838 when the work of inspecting began,
no trace of appeal to court can be found. Bar examiners determine
questions of fact- qualifications of applicants -by written examina-
tions, and inclination to challenge examiners' conclusions is wholly ab-
sent. District inspectors for the ICC inspected 105,000 locomotives last
year, finding 37,000 defects on 9,570, and ordering 560 out of ser-
vice;1. although appeals are allowed from inspector to Director and
from Director to Commission, in twenty years seven appeals have been
taken to the Director and none to the Commission.' If these figures
are at all representative, administrative methods are highly satisfactory;
at worst, the potentiality of judicial hearing can do no harm. Yet it
may correct occasional injustices, and its availability undoubtedly has a
salutary effect upon administrative officials.
Emergency and Temporary Action. The Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 provides: "Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator
such action is necessary . . . he may, without regard to the foregoing
provisions of this subsection [prescribing procedures] issue temporary
regulations or orders establishing as a maximum price . . . the price
.. prevailing . . . five days prior to the date of issuance of such
temporary regulations or orders; but such temporary regulation or
149. REPoRT (1941) 36.
150. ICC ANN. REP. (1941) 96.
151. At'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commerce Commission, SEN. Doe. No.
10, Pt. 14, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 93.
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order shall be effective for not more than sixty days. . .,"1' Here
is an authorization for administrative action which may drastically affect
vital interests not only without hearing but also without even so much
as consultation with an industry advisory committee. Of course, emer-
gency is complete justification. When the building is burning or con-
tagion is spreading or putrid poultry is about to be sold, action must be
immediate, leaving adjustment of rights for a later day.
The Interstate Commerce Act prohibits changes in rates or fares
except after 30 days' notice, but gives the Commission power to make
exceptions to the notice requirement."6 8 Last year 9,155 applications
requested permission to establish rates or fares on less than 30 days'
notice or waiver of tariff-publishing rules; specific orders granted 8,722
and denied 433.154 The average time from receipt of application until
dispatch of the order is approximately three days.'" Obviously, for-
mality must yield; nevertheless conferences or quick informal hearings
are not unknown in exceptional cases.
The Securities Act makes registration statements effective twenty days
after filing. Examination of a registration statement normally consumes
about ten days. If a deficiency is discovered concerning which a dispute
arises, and if the registrant is to avoid the possibly disastrous institu-
tion of a stop order proceeding, the dispute must be settled by hasty
methods providing protection far short of hearing. A registrant dis-
satisfied with a deficiency letter may only confer with the Commission
or its representatives. Then, when the registrant files an amendment, the
twenty-day period begins again unless the Commission consents to ac-
celeration. "The question of acceleration is often of considerable moment
to the registrant."' 6 Yet, except in rare instances, acceleration questions
have been determined without even so much as conferences. Exigencies
of the twenty-day provision must in practice be the root of all answers
to procedure questions.
One might go on through the agencies and tabulate innumerable in-
stances of necessity for immediate action, where haste must supplant
other considerations. Thus, temporary action pending full hearing is
often appropriate in licensing. Many licenses are designed to provide
control over licensees for the protection of the public. When the agency
learns that a licensee is engaging in practices dangerous to the public,
it might be required to provide opportunity for hearing before acting,
for the licensee's interest is normally strongly on the side of requiring
152. Pub. L. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942), § 2(a).
153. 41 STAT. 483 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 6(3) (1940).
154. ICC ANN. REP. (1941) 134.
155. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commerce Commission, SEN. Doc. No.
10, Pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 44-45.
156. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Securities & Exchange Commission, SEN. Doc.
No. 10, Pt. 13, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 26.
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a procedure which includes full safeguards before the licensee can be
adjudged guilty of unlawful conduct. Sometimes, of course, the peril
may be so pressing that the license should be suspended pending hearing
on the question of revocation or restoration. The clearest case permitting
this is Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Public Service Commission.1 7 Plaintiff
for twenty years had dealt in securities, doing a business in Wisconsin
of twelve to nineteen million dollars per year. The Commission, pur-
suant to statutory authority, on its own motion and without prior oppor-
tunity for hearing, suspended plaintiff's broker's license, on the ground
that officers of the company had been indicted for using the mails to
defraud. Plaintiff sought an injunction on the ground of unconstitu-
tionality of suspension without opportunity for hearing. The court up-
held the order.
Even the power of suspension, however, need not be exercised without
safeguards. Hasty informal hearings or conferences should in some
circumstances precede the issuance of the suspension order, especially
when important interests may be adversely affected. A professional man
may suffer irreparable injury from a suspension order improvidently
issued.
the ICC and other rate-fixing agencies have authority to suspend
newly flied rates and simultaneously order a hearing." g The Communi-
cations Commission in its telephone and telegraph regulation may
suspend "any new charge, classification, regulation, or practice." 113 The
period of suspension varies; for the ICC it is longest - seven months.
Interests of some magnitude may hinge on the decision whether or not
to suspend. Last year the ICC suspended 785 rates and refused to
suspend 619."6" About ninety-five per cent of all suspensions are made
upon protest, the others being on the Commission's own motion. Most
protests are made by telegram, and the Commission, as a safeguard,
always notifies the carrier by telegram of the receipt of protests, sum-
marizing the contentions advanced. In about twenty per cent of the
cases conferences are held on the question of suspension.Y'
157. 212 Ivris. 184, 248 N. NNV. 458 (1933). For federal statutes allox.ing suspending
licenses pending hearing, see Food & Drug, 52 STAT. 1048 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 344(b)
(1940); Motor Carrier, 49 STAT. 555 (1935), amended 52 STAT. 123S (1933). 49 U. S.
C. §312(a) (1940), amended 54 STAT. 924 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 312(a) (1940); Civil
Aeronautics, 52 STAT. 1011 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §559 (1940).
158. CAA, 52 STAT. 1018 (1938), 49 U. S. C. § 642(g) (1940); Federal Power Com-
mission, 49 STAT. 851 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 824(d) (1940); ICC, Railroads, 41 STAT.
486 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 15(7) (1940), as amended 54 STAT. 912 (1940), 49 U. S. C.
§ 15(7) (Supp. 1941) ; ICC, Motor Carriers, 49 STAT. 558 (1935), 49 U. S. C. § 316(g)
(1940), as amended 54 STAT. 924 (1940), 49 U. S. C. §316(g) (1940); ICC, Water
Carriers, 54 STAT. 937 (1940), 49 U. S. C. §907(g) (Supp. 1941).
159. FCC, 48 STAT. 1071 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §204 (1940).
160. ICC Axx. REP. (1941) 135.
161. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Interstate Commerce Commission, Sm. Doe. No.
10, Pt. 11, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 49-51.
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A typical decision illustrates what is invblved in suspension cases. In
ill. C. Kiser Co. v. Central Georgia Railway,; 2 complainants were whole-
sale dealers in boots and shoes in Atlanta, purchasing from Boston,
Providence and New York, and paying for water and rail transporta-
tion at 95 cents per 100 pounds, the rate approved by the ICC after
"two or three different hearings". The carriers filed a new rate of
$1.14 and $1.19. Complainants had made extensive investments and
contracts for both purchase and sale of shoes in reliance upon continu-
ance of the old rates. The new rates would impose an additional freight
burden of approximately $15,000 during one season. Complainants
protested the new rates and requested suspension, but after "informal
hearing" (conferences) the Commission declined to suspend. Com-
plainants sought an injunction against changing the rates without full
hearing and without a determination of the reasonableness of the new
rates. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order but on
full consideration dissolved it and denied injunction; the Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed. The question whether or not the newly filed rates
shall be suspended during the period pending full hearing is for the
Commission alone to decide, on the basis of informal hearings or con-
ferences, and the courts will not interfere.'
It seems a short jump from the long-approved, widely-used suspension
power to a power to fix temporary rates pending more permanent orders
issued after full hearings. Mr. Justice Black has collected horrible
examples of rate cases consuming years 164 - one beginning in 1921 and
not yet ended in 1937."'0 Need for temporary rate-fixing; in the face
of such experience, is obvious. The Supreme Court once was coldly
unsympathetic: "They were final legislative acts as to the period during
which they should remain in effect pending final determination; and if
the rates prescribed were confiscatory the Company would be deprived
of a reasonable return upon its property during such period, without
remedy, unless their enforcement should be enjoined." The Court ac-
cordingly affirmed an injunction against temporary rates, even though
the injunction rested solely on pleadings and affidavits.'
In Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,0 7 the
court struck down a temporary rate order issued pursuant to a statute
providing: "The Commission is empowered to issue conditional, tem-
porary, emergency and supplemental orders." The court said this pro-
162. 236 Fed. 573 (S. D. Ga. 1916), aff'd, 239 Fed. 718 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917).
163. For further authority upholding suspension, see Manhattan Transit Co. v. United
States, 24 F. Supp. 174, 177 (D. Mass. 1938), collecting cases.
164. McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419, 435 (1938).
165. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U. S. 292 (1937).
166. Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43 (1923).
167. 232 Wis. 274, 287 N. W. 122 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 657 (1940).
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vision was subject to procedural requirements of other parts of the
statute, and further declared: "The Legislature certainly never intended
to authorize the Commission to issue orders affecting the rights of citi-
zens without opportunity to be heard. A legislative act purporting to
confer such power would be clearly invalid." Yet the reasons advanced
by the Commission in support of its temporary order seem exceedingly
persuasive. The temporary order in question was issued after 35 months
of investigation, when the record comprised 7,721 pages of testimony
and 428 exhibits; the Commission had concluded accounting and engi-
neering phases of its case, and the Company had cross-examined but had
introduced only a slight part of its affirmative evidence. "It would seem
to us to be a stultification of the State's regulatory power if, realizing
that this case has already gone on for three years and may endure for
a fourth, we should in the meantime be hamstrung and powerless to
protect the public against rates which, based upon the evidence before
us, are unreasonably high. Particularly is this consideration reinforced
at the present time by the Commission's engineering appraisal .
which . . . demonstrates . . . that the rate base herein determined,
is conservative . We are forced to conclude that we would be
remiss in our duty if we did not issue a further temporary order at
this time. To assert to the contrary and hold that we should have to
go through the exhaustive process of hearings until every bit of direct
and redirect, cross and recross, rebuttal and" sur-rebuttal, has been com-
pletely introduced, sifted and argued down to the last decimal before
even a temporary order may be issued, is to declare that . . the
statutes in the various states for temporary orders are meaningless and
null." 10 8
The Supreme Court in 1942 sustained an interim order of the Federal
Power Commission, issued after extensive hearings but before their
completion, based upon the companies' statement of book cost, their
estimate of value of physical property, and their estimate of prospective
income: "The companies cannot complain that they were denied a full
hearing because they had not been able to examine or redirect their
own witnesses who had not been cross-examined, or because they had
no opportunity to cross-examine or rebut witnesses who were not offered
by the Commission. The right to a full hearing before any tribunal does
not include the right to challenge or rely on evidence not offered or
considered.' 9
Another promising temporary-rate development is the enactment of
statutes permitting recoupment from losses accruing from temporary
rates later adjudged too low. This system is glowingly described by 11r.
168. Id. at 296, 287 N. W. at 134.
169. Feder4l Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 736 (U. S. 1942).
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Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion: "The statute . . . is a
conscientious and informed endeavor to meet difficulties engendered by
legal doctrines which have been widely rejected by the great weight of
economic opinion, by authoritative legislative investigations, by utility
commissions throughout the country, and by impressive judicial dissents.
As a result of this long process of experience and reflection, the two
states in which utilities play the biggest financial part- New York and
Pennsylvania -have evolved the so-called recoupment scheme for tem-
porary rate-fixing (thereby avoiding some of the most wasteful aspects
of rate litigation) as a fair means of accommodating public and private
interests. It is a carefully guarded device for securing 'a judgment from
experience as against a judgment from speculation' . . . in dealing
with a problem of such elusive economic complexity as the determination
of what return will be sufficient to attract capital . . . and at the same
time be fair to the public . . ."170
Limitation of Requirement of Opportunity to Be Heard to One Stage
of Entire Proceeding. Due process requirements are satisfied if at any
time before governmental action becomes final hearings are allowed
either by administrative or by judicial action. We have already observed
numerous cases- particularly those relating to privilege and inspection
-which uphold administrative action on the ground that judicial review
supplies administrative deficiencies. This doctrine is widely accepted.'
In the leading Hagar case,172 the Court rejected a contention that due
process was violated by levying swamp reclamation assessments without
opportunity to be heard, observing that collection could be made only
through court proceedings and that the requirements "are all satisfied
where a hearing in court is thus allowed." The Supreme Court has
stated the guiding principle: "It is enough that all available defenses
may be presented to a competent tribunal before exaction of the tax
170. Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S. 104, 123-24 (1939). The Penn-
sylvania recoupment statute requires "reasonable notice and hearing"; it is a way of
avoiding the full and protracted hearing familiar when the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames,
169 U. S. 466 (1898) is applied, not a way of avoiding hearing altogether on the tem-
porary rates. Of course, on the requirements of Smyth v. Ames, Federal Power Com-
mission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 736 (U. S. 1942) must be considered.
See Comments (1937) Temporary Utility Rates, 46 YALE L. J. 505; (1939) 87 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 456; Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1027; Fisher, Rate Regulation--Validity
of Temporary Rate Order (1939) 38 MIcE. L. REv. 72.
171. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S.
589 (1931); Belcher v. Farrar, 8 Allen 325 (Mass. 1864); Commonwealth v. Hargis
Bank & Trust Co., 233 Ky. 801, 26 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1930). That the same principle
applies to judicial action, see American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932).
172. 111 U. S. 701 (1884).
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and before the command of the state to pay it becomes final and irre-
vocable." 73
But when the review is not de novo, are requirements satisfied? A
recent tax case held that review limited to determining whether over-
valuation was willful does not remedy the earlier failure to provide
opportunity for hearing on the question whether the valuation was merely
excessive.17 4 But in Bouriois v. Chapnan'7  the Supreme Court held
due process satisfied by the following review provision: "From the
refusal . . . to issue a certificate of registration . . . appeal shall lie
to the superior court." The Court did not bother to inquire whether.
this provision might be interpreted as permitting only a determination
whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has even held that availability of judicial review through
injunction proceedings satisfies due process requirements.'7
Especially revealing is Southern Railway v. Virginia." The state
highway commissioner ordered elimination of a grade crossing without
allowing the railroad to be heard on the question whether the elimina-
tion should be ordered. The statute did not provide for judicial review,
but the state court had declared: "Should the power vested in the High-
way Commissioner be arbitrarily exercised, equity's long arm will stay
his hand."' 17 The majority of the Supreme Court held this insufficient:
"The infirmities of the enactment are not relieved by an indefinite right
of review in respect of some action spoken of as arbitrary."'10 Three
justices dissented on the ground that the power "may be exercised with-
out notice or a hearing . . . provided adequate opportunity is afforded
for review in the event that the power is perverted or abused; and that
such opportunity has been given by the statutes of Virginia as construed
by its highest court." The dissenters would thus uphold the action even
though at neither administrative nor judicial stage is opportunity given
for hearing on the merits."s
Lack of opportunity to be heard preceding administrative decision may
be remedied by administrative review. Thus, a board of revision of tax
173. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393, 396 (1934).
174. Orcutt v. Crawford, 85 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936).
175. 301 U. S. 183 (1937).
176. Security Trust and Safety Vault Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, 333 (1905):
"Whether the opportunity to be heard which has been afforded to the plaintiff has been
pursuant to the provisions of some statute . . . or by the holding of the court that the
plaintiff has such right in the trial of a suit to enjoin the collection of the tax, is nut
material."
177. 290 U. S. 190 (1933).
178. Southern Railway v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 779, 794, 167 S. E. 578, 582 (1933).
179. 290 U. S. 190, 199.
180. The dissenters were Hughes, C. J., Stone and Cardozo, JJ. In predicting what
the present Court would do, I think much weight should be given to the fact that Mr.
Justice Brandeis was with the majority.
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assessments may by giving opportunity for hearing make tip for the lack
of such opportunity preceding the assessment.'"' When it was contended
that an industry committee of the Wage and Hour Administration had
unconstitutionally failed to allow opportunity for hearing, the Court
rejected the contention on the ground that proceedings before the Admin-
istrator satisfy the requirements of due process.'82 In United States v.
Illinois Central Ry.,' 88 the ICC specifically refused a hearing before
entering an order fixing certain rates. The Supreme Court held that
an injunction against enforcement of the rates should be refused on
the ground that under the statute the Commission may properly issue
the order in the first instance without hearing if it will allow hearing
upon complaint after issuing the order but before it becomes effective:
"Without attempting to lay down any general rule, but confining our-
selves to the statute and case in hand, we accordingly hold that it was
not essential, under the due process of law clause, that a hearing should
be accorded in advance of the initiating order. It is enough that oppor-
tunity was given for a full and fair hearing before the order became
operative." 8
4
This principle was not acceptable to a lower federal court. The
National Bituminous Coal Commission, without prior hearing, prescribed
minimum prices, on the theory that the statutory requirement of hearing
could be satisfied by permitting the filing of petitions and holding hear-
ings thereon before the effective date of the price order. Despite statu-
tory provisions which might easily have been interpreted as consistent
with this theory, and despite the Illinois Central precedent, the court
enjoined the order, even though the complaining parties had not first
pursued the administrative remedy available to them.'
181. Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660 (1890). In McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S.
234 (1923), where a Board increased valuation of property for tax purposes, without
opportunity for hearing, the Court rejected a contention that due process requirements
were violated, because the taxpayer had opportunity to demand arbitration. But cf. Tur-
ner v. Wade, 254 U. S. 64 (1920).
182. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, 312 U. S.
126 (1941). See also Louisville & N. R. R. v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 185 (N. D,
I1.) (1934). The principle works both forwards and backwards. Thus, where hearing
was given before assessment, it was held that none to correct errors afterwards was re-
quired. Pittsburgh, Cinn., Ch. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 426 (1894). A
different application of the same principle is found in The New England Divisions Case,
261 U. S. 184 (1923), approving the use of typical evidence to support a general order,
relying on the idea that more accurate evidence may be used in future specific cases.
183. 291 U. S. 457 (1934), 43 YALE L. J. 1300. Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and
Cardozo, concurring specially, would have disposed of the case on the ground that the
respondents had filed with the Commission no complaint designed to secure a hearing.
184. 291 U. S. 457, 463 (1934).
185. Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bit. Coal Comm,, 96 F. (2d) 517 (App.
D. C. 1938); see Comment (1938) 6 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 477. 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 15
U. S. C. § 829 (Supp. 1941) requires opportunity to be heard for every "order which is
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Some administrative regulations have full force and effect of law;
others, like the Treasury tax regulations, are merely interpretative and
purport to do no more than guide administrative adjudication., s' Com-
plete judicial review is available, the theory being that the reviewing
court is in no way bound to follow the regulations. Therefore, the
prevailing practice of issuing such interpretative regulations without
providing opportunity to be heard can violate no constitutional require-
ments. But the wisdom of denying opportunity to participate in formu-
lation of interpretative regulations is not so clear. Interpretative regu-
lations are often decisive of cases. Courts lean heavily upon themYs T
And the Supreme Court has even declared that reenactment of a statute
means that "Congress must be taken to have approved the administrative
construction and thereby to have given it the force of law."'" From a
practical standpoint, the theoretical availability of complete judicial
review does not prevent interpretative regulations from having perma-
nent substantive effect, and although hearings are not feasible, all oppor-
tunity for participation in formulation of regulations ought not to be
denied."8 9
Even though due process may be satisfied by judicial review, it does
not follow that judicial review is an adequate substitute for adminis-
trative hearings when these are the best practical means of finding facts.
Indeed, from the standpoint of both efficient administration and adequate
safeguards for private interests, the advantages of administrative rather
than judicial hearings are frequently patent. For protection of private
parties, a regularized administrative procedure may afford far better
safeguards than a theoretical right of review, which is so often illusory.
If the amount involved is small, if the hardship of appealing to a court
is great,' if the court will be strongly influenced by the agency's view,
subject to judicial review." The provision for review contains nothing to prevent appli-
cation of the usual doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court
might therefore properly have held that a general order subject to administrative attach
before its effectiveness is not an order which is subject to review, and that the statute
therefore does not require opportunity to be heard prior to the original order. And con-
stitutional objections could be met by applying precisely the technique of the Illinois
Central case.
186. See Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations (1940) 29 GEo. L. J. 1.
187. E.g., Houston v. St. Louis Ind. Pacdng Co., 249 U. S. 479 (1919).
188. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110, 115 (1939). But cf.
Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., Inc., 308 U. S. 90, 100-01 (1939).
189. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Administration of Intenal Revenue Laws, Srun.
Doc. No. 10, Pt. 9, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 64-65.
190. A good example of hardship in appealing to a court is Jackson v. Bell, 143 Tenn.
452, 226 S. V. 207 (1920), where the owner of a building condemned by a fire commis-
sioner could go to court only by posting bond for court costs and "all damages that may
be occasioned on account of the failure of such owner or occupant to comply with tile
order . . ." Sheer expense or inconvenience of a judicial proceeding may often in a
practical sense defeat the opportunity for judicial review.
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if in spite of the theoretical scope of review the practical inquiry is into
reasonableness rather than rightness, if only the exceptional case can
go to court- if for any reason the administrative decision importantly
affects the final outcome- safeguards at the administrative stage should
be preferred to the safeguards provided by judicial review.1'
CONCLUSIONS
The solution of the problem of determining when to require oppor-
tunity to be heard in the administrative, process lies in discovering the
best practical means in the varying circumstances for assuring enlight-
ened administrative action which will protect those affected by consider-
ing their evidence and their argument and by letting them subject to
their testing processes the materials on which the agency acts. Methods
other than hearings are often most effective for this purpose; private
interests frequently may be best protected by such methods as inter-
views, conferences, questionnaires, submission of tentative orders or
regulations for written comments, collaboration between agency repre-
sentatives and private representatives in drafting rules, consultation of
agency officials with advisory groups which represent private parties,
reception of written evidence and argument without an oral process.
Sometimes two or more of these informal processes should be combined.
Judicial decisions which grapple with this problem are regrettably
deficient in their frequent failure to give adequate recognition to the
alternative devices that may be superior to hearings.
A speech-making or public-meeting type of hearing sometimes affords
the most efficient way for the agency to safeguard private rights and
develop the necessary information and understanding, either with or
without informal processes; a hearing resembling a legislative committee
investigation is often preferable to a trial. A trial is appropriate when
a dispute arises about adjudicative facts, that is, facts which peculiarly
relate to particular parties, their past conduct, or their circumstances,
191. One who has not read the decisions on opportunity to be heard would naturally
expect the question of due process to be whether or not the required opportunity has been
given, not whether a statute provides or fails to provide the opportunity. The expecta-
tion in my opinion would be thoroughly sound. But the view to the contrary, although
probably on the wane, has considerable vitality. E.g.: "If the statute did not provide
for a notice in any form, it is not material that as a matter of grace or favor notice may
have been given of the proposed assessment. It is not what notice, uncalled for by the
statute, the taxpayer may have received in a particular case that is material, but the
question is, whether any notice is provided for by the statute." Security Trust Co. v.
Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, 333 (1906). For the more enlightened view to the contrary,
see Bourjois v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183, 188 (1937). Professor Gelihorn traces the his-
torical development and analyzes the cases with his usual masterful skill in G.u1noRN,
op. cit. supra note 76, at 451-60.
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business or property. Economic, financial and statistical facts of a
general character, not limited to particular parties, usually may be better
developed without following courtroom methods. A tendency in sonic
quarters to require a trial to resolve questions of interpretation or law
or policy, when no specific facts are disputed and no conflicting evidence
is introduced, leads to avoidable inefficiency and serves no useful pur-
pose. Cross-examination by adversaries is an excellent device for testing
proof, but it is not a proper vehicle for persuasion. Despite some sweep-
ing judicial generalizations that fixing rates and wages and prices requires
the trial technique, I think that one must inquire into the kind of ma-
terials needed, and their sources, before deciding how to go about getting
those materials, and examination of specific price-fixing functions reveals
that trial methods are sometimes inferior to other methods for protect-
ing private interests and securing the requisite information and under-
standing for wise price regulation. Such devices as the ICC shortened
and modified procedures are of vast significance and their further devel-
opment and more extensive use should be encouraged.
The dogma and conceptualism which plague this subject too often
lead unsuspecting judges to unjust decisions. iany opinions revolve
around separation-of-powers labels, although the labels probably play
a smaller part in judicial motivation than in opinion writing. Realism
requires recognition that a function may be somewhat judicial and
somewhat legislative and neither wholly one nor wholly the other, and
that a function need not necessarily be classified the same way for all
purposes. The more discerning courts decide on the basis of the desir-
able procedures what label to attach, not on the basis of the label what
procedure to require.
The oft-repeated notion that an agency may perform a function with-
out a hearing if the legislature could perform the same function without
a hearing is unsound in that it ignores vital differences between agency
and legislature. Agencies whose members represent constituencies are
exceptional.
The major premise of some decisions that hearings are not feasible
when the number of affected parties is large is unsupported by experi-
ence. The true test for the appropriateness of a trial is not the number
of parties but whether the controversy relates to facts which concern
individual parties. When adjudicative facts are disputed, trial methods
are desirable irrespective of the number of parties. Even when the
needed information is general, or when the problem is one of policy or
discretion or law, a large number of parties does not justify denying
all opportunity to reach the eyes and ears of the deciding agency.
The doctrine that privileges may be taken away or adversely affected
without giving their holders opportunity to be heard on disputed adjudi-
cative facts is pernicious. To allow administrative officers summarily
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to destroy a profitable business when adjudicative facts are denied is
unsound government. A procedure which is unfair for inflicting a
penalty is not rendered fair by using it to withdraw a benefit. Happily,
the pervasive judicial indulgence in conceptualism about privileges is
largely limited to language and is decisive of relatively few cases.
When direct observation rather than hearing is the most reliable
method for finding facts, courts permit agencies to decide without hear-
ing; with few exceptions, however, full judicial remedies for improper
administrative action are made available. The resulting system seems
satisfactory, for judicial hearings are held in reserve for correction of
possible abuses but in practice hearings are held in a negligible portion
of the cases.
Although emergency action without previous hearing is sometimes
appropriate, safeguards usually may still be provided through informal
methods for hasty participation by parties. Too little developed is the
idea of temporary action pending hearing, for failure to act until pro-
tracted hearings are completed is often the equivalent of an adjudication
in favor of those who advocate continuing the status quo for the period
of the hearing, without giving their opponents an opportunity to be
heard. Of course, when important rights are involved, temporary action
should hot be taken without providing such informal safeguards as
circumstances permit.
The prevailing judicial doctrine is that improper denial of adminis-
trative hearing may be remedied by availability of judicial review of
sufficient scope, but widespread reliance upon this doctrine is unfortunate.
Safeguards at the administrative stage are clearly superior to safeguards
by a theoretical right of review which in practice is often illusory.
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